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Cognitive flexibility is important for creativity, for learning when reward 
contingencies change, and for redirecting our attention. Previous research has shown that 
creative behavior improves with positive mood, but researchers disagree about whether 
other behaviors under the umbrella term “cognitive flexibility” are similarly facilitated. 
Also, the outcomes of positive mood might depend on the particular positive emotion. In 
my dissertation research, I contribute to the current debate on this issue by assessing 
which emotional states influence which types of cognitive flexibility, and why.  
I focus on the distinction between associative, regulative, and attentional 
flexibility. Breaking the set of typical associations and creating new associations is called 
associative flexibility. Associative flexibility underlies creative performance in idea 
generation and enhances inclusiveness in categorization tasks. Regulative flexibility is an 
executive function, and is important when people need to deal with changing rules and 
reward contingencies. It refers to the ability to identify and adjust to different 
contingencies. Attentional flexibility is the ability to switch attention between different 
types of tasks, or between different stimulus features. Other types of cognitive flexibility 
are not the topic of the dissertation; for example, flexibility can refer to evaluative 






re-constructing a spatial configuration), or temporal flexibility (e.g., variability in 
rhythm).  
Studies in social psychology have typically used associative flexibility tasks to 
measure cognitive flexibility. For example, ”[f]lexibility as a measure of creativity 
manifests itself in the use of different cognitive categories and perspectives and of broad 
and inclusive cognitive categories” (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008, p. 740). Similarly, 
“creativity, remote associations, perceptions of relatedness among cognitions . . . [are 
seen as] indications of integration and cognitive flexibility (Isen, 1990, p. 80). A typical 
finding is that positive emotions improve performance (e.g., Isen and colleagues). For 
example, positive affect increases fluency in idea generation (e.g., Isen, Labroo, & 
Durlach, 2004; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990). Also, positive affect increases the 
number of items included in a category and the variety of elements chosen as acceptable 
category members (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984).  
However, in other areas of psychology, such as cognitive psychology, cognitive 
neuroscience, and psychiatry, ‘flexibility’ more often refers to attentional and regulative 
flexibility. For example, a study title reads “Shifting set about task switching: Behavioral 
and neural evidence for distinct forms of cognitive flexibility” (Ravizza & Carter, 2008). 
Also, flexibility impairments in schizophrenia are assessed as attentional flexibility (e.g., 
Morice, 1990). Similarly, in “a developmental study of cognitive flexibility,” flexibility is 
assessed in set shifting (Crone, Ridderinkhof, Worm, Somsen, & Molen, 2004). Others 





Mixed effects for the influence of emotions on attentional flexibility have been 
found. For example, positive affect facilitates switching attention to novel stimuli, but 
impairs switching attention to stimuli that were previously ignored (e.g., Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004). Also, happiness impairs performance in a switching Stroop task 
(Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). The discrepancy in the application of the term 
‘flexibility,’ and the discrepancy in the findings regarding the influence of emotions on 
flexibility need to be resolved with a theory that can integrate the research findings from 
the different literatures. 
The goals of this research are to (a) review the influence of positive and negative 
emotions on associative flexibility, (b) examine how different positive emotions 
influence regulative and attentional flexibility, and (c) identify mediator variables. The 
dissertation will contribute to the literature by integrating methods from social and 
cognitive psychology, by examining the influence of different positive and negative 
emotions on different types of cognitive flexibility, and by investigating underlying 
mechanisms for this influence.  
The influence of emotions on associative, regulative, and attentional flexibility is 
examined in three papers. In chapter 2, the influence of emotions on associative 
flexibility is reviewed meta-analytically (goal a). In chapter 3, the influence of different 
positive and negative emotions on regulative flexibility is assessed with an experiment 
(goal b). The effect of different positive emotions on associative, regulative, and 
attentional flexibility are assessed simultaneously in study 1 of chapter 4 (goals a and b). 






More specifically, in chapter 2 the influence of emotions on associative flexibility 
is reviewed meta-analytically. A relatively large body of experimental studies indicates 
that, overall, positive affect increases associative flexibility (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 
2008; Davis, 2009). For example, positive compared to neutral affect increases breadth of 
categorization (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984). The effects of negative affect on associative 
flexibility are varied and sometimes do not differ from control conditions (Baas et al., 
2008; Davis, 2009). Given the large body of research, a meta-analysis is used to review 
the behavioral effects of positive and negative emotions on idea generation and 
categorization, and to identify moderator variables.  
In chapter 3, the influence of different positive and negative emotions on 
regulative flexibility is assessed. Research on the influence of emotions on regulative 
flexibility is less developed than research on associative flexibility. To our knowledge, no 
study has examined the importance of affective states for learning changes in reward 
contingencies. Therefore, the influence of different positive and negative emotions on 
reversal learning is assessed with a Reversal Learning task.  
While the review of previous research in chapter 2 and the results from chapter 3, 
jointly suggest that happiness overall improves associative flexibility and reduces 
regulative flexibility, the simultaneous assessment of both types of flexibility is necessary 
to rule out confounding factors. A within-subjects design with associative and regulative 
flexibility has the additional benefit that it can provide specific insights. For example, 
does happiness improve associative flexibility and reduce regulative flexibility merely on 
a group level, or do individuals show negative correlations between those types of 





the other? These questions are answered in study 1 of chapter 4, in which the effects of 
different positive emotions on associative and regulative flexibility are assessed 
simultaneously.  
Study 1 of chapter 4 also assesses the influence of emotions on attentional 
flexibility. Several studies have compared the influence of positive and negative emotions 
on tasks that require the switching of attention and found mixed results that depend on 
the specific design of the task. For example, positive affect impairs performance in 
switching to inhibited stimuli, but switching to novel stimuli is improved under positive 
affect (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Chapter 4 adds to this literature by examining the 
influence of emotions on attentional flexibility in a California Card Sorting Test (Delis, 
Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). 
A valid concern is that the complexity of findings reported in chapters 2 and 3 
cannot be encompassed by a simple a priori explanation. In an attempt to increase 
parsimony and directly test explanations, study 2 of chapter 4 examines underlying 
mechanisms for the findings of chapter 3. Previous research suggests that associative 
flexibility is improved due to increases in global processing (e.g., Isen, 1999). In study 2 
of chapter 4, I examine whether global processing matters for regulative flexibility. Also, 
given that reduced goal maintenance has been associated with positive affect (Dreisbach, 
2006), I examine the importance of goal maintenance for performance in regulative 
flexibility.  
In the experimental research reviewed and conducted in this dissertation, the 
effect of emotions on performance in a subsequent situation is assessed. Because the 





they are called incidental emotions (as opposed to integral emotions; Bodenhausen, 
1993). Emotions can be defined as a syndrome of a subjective feeling (e.g., pleasant, 
aroused), a judgment about the situation (e.g., you are responsible), behavioral tendencies 
that encompass cognition (e.g., global versus local; flexible versus inflexible) and action 
(e.g., approaching versus avoiding), physiological changes (e.g., heart rate), and 
sometimes an emotion label (e.g., happy). Compared to moods, emotions typically are 
elicited by a specific event and are short-lived. This poses a problem in experimental 
designs where multiple tasks are used to measure cognitive flexibility, because emotions 
might vanish before the task is administered. In chapters 3 and 4, emotions are therefore 
aroused twice within the experimental session. 
With its goals and findings, the dissertation can be perceived as a critical analysis 
of the statement that it “is now well recognized that positive affect leads to greater 
cognitive flexibility and facilitates creative problem solving across a broad range of 
settings” (Ashby, Isen,  Turken, 1999, p. 530) with regard to four aspects: First, the 
validity of the statement in its explicit sense is examined by reviewing existing research 
on the influence of positive emotions on flexibility in the creativity domain. Second, the 
implied consequence that negative emotions reduce flexibility is assessed. Third, the 
generalizability of the statement to all positive emotions is called into question. Finally, 
the generalizability of the statement to different types of flexibility is examined. 
However, I want to emphasize that the criticism generated in this dissertation only refers 
to the specific claim. The findings are not a critique of the scholarship of researchers 





limitations of our current knowledge and suggest testing the validity and limitations of 
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A Meta-Analysis of Positive and Negative Emotions’ Impact on Cognitive Breadth 
 
Past research shows that positive emotions often increase the number and the 
unusualness of ideas, and the elements included in a category. The underlying cognitive 
tendency has been called 'flexibility’ or ‘cognitive breadth’ (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 
1999; Fredrickson, 1998). If happiness leads to thriving in various domains, such as idea 
generation, social relationships, and health (e.g., Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005), it 
is tempting to conclude that the more positive affect is experienced, the more 
inventiveness, friends, and vitality will be gained. Likewise, although few positive 
psychologists explicitly discuss the outcomes of negative emotions, it is implied that 
negative emotions will narrow the chances for success. However, the outcomes of 
positive and negative emotions do not necessarily lie on a single continuum. Positive 
psychologists are often unclear about these issues, despite empirical evidence that 
requires clarification, and despite grounding positive psychology on the premise that the 
outcomes of positive and negative emotions are not mere opposites of each other 
(Seligman, 2003).  
To investigate whether negative emotions have the opposite effect of positive 
emotions, the current study explicitly compares the effects of positive, neutral, and 





research, a meta-analysis will be used to review the behavioral effects of positive and 
negative emotions on flexibility in idea generation and categorization. A second goal of 
the study is to identify moderators in the relationship between emotion and associative 
flexibility.  
In the experimental research reviewed in this paper, the effect of emotions on 
performance in a subsequent situation is assessed. Because the emotions are aroused prior 
to the performance situation and are not an integral part of it, they are called incidental 
emotions (as opposed to integral emotions; Bodenhausen, 1993). Emotions can be 
defined as a syndrome of a subjective feeling (e.g., pleasant, aroused), a judgment about 
the situation (e.g., you are responsible), behavioral tendencies that encompass cognition 
(e.g., global versus local; flexible versus inflexible) and action (e.g., approaching versus 
avoiding), physiological changes (e.g., heart rate), and sometimes an emotion label (e.g., 
happy). Compared to moods, emotions typically are elicited by a specific event and are 
short-lived. Although in experimental research, emotions are aroused by a specific event 
(the experimental manipulation), the affective state is often not well differentiated in 
studies comparing general positive to negative affect. Therefore, the boundary of emotion 
and mood is somewhat blurry, and some researchers refer to the manipulated state as a 
mood state (e.g., Bohner & Schwarz, 1993).  
The findings of a meta-analysis always depend on the aggregation of dependent 
variables. In previous meta-analysis on the effect of emotions on creativity, 
categorization tasks have been clustered in different ways; either together with idea 
generation and remote associate tasks in a cluster of ideation tasks (Davis, 2009), or with 





flexibility tasks (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). For the contrast of positive with 
negative emotions, these two types of study have found different overall effects; more 
specifically, for the first cluster, positive emotions increased performance compared to 
negative emotions, but for the second cluster, positive and negative emotions did not 
differ. The current meta-analysis investigates the influence of emotions across 
categorization and idea generation tasks, and distinguishes between the quantity and 
quality of ideas and category members. Also, the current meta-analysis investigates task 
difficulty as a moderator variable that has not been examined in previous quantitative 
literature reviews. 
The Positivity Bias 
In the current literature, the effects of positive emotions are often cited without 
discussing the influence of negative emotions, resulting in a biased perception of the 
influence of negative emotions. An example is the discussion of the findings by Isen and 
Daubman (1984) with 240 citations (ISI Web of Science, Sep. 15 2007). The paper 
presents three studies in which positive emotions lead to broader categories. In studies 1 
and 2, category breadth is assessed qualitatively by asking participants to rate the extent 
to which unusual elements are category members. The results show that happy 
participants are more likely to include unusual elements in a category. In study 3, 
quantitative category breadth is assessed by counting the number of categories built from 
a fixed number of elements. Again, positive emotions result in broader categories. 
However, in all three studies, negative emotions also show a non-significant tendency to 
increase category breadth. Although Isen and Daubman (1984) thoroughly discuss the 





focus exclusively on the broadening effect of positive emotions on categorization (e.g., 
Fredrickson, 1998; Friedman & Förster, 2005; Isen & Baron, 1991). The reader is left 
with the idea that the happier one is, the more creative one will be, and the sadder one is, 
the less creative. 
A meta-analysis by Lyubomirsky and colleagues (2005) promotes a similar 
message. Analyzing cross-sectional, longitudinal, and experimental studies, the authors 
conclude that positive affect increases sociability and activity, altruism, liking of self and 
others, strong bodies and immune systems, and effective conflict resolution skills. Of 
particular relevance for this paper is the impact of emotions on original thinking, which 
includes idea generation, categorization, and creative insight tasks. The report only 
provides a qualitative assessment of the homogeneity of the effect sizes for originality. 
Although the authors state that “occasionally, people in a sad mood are also more original 
than those in a neutral mood” (p. 838), they later conclude that the “evidence is weaker 
[than for sociability and activity, altruism, liking of self and others, immune system, and 
effective conflict resolution], but still consistent, that pleasant moods promote original 
thinking” (p. 840).  
The implication is that the happier one is, the more cognitive flexibility will 
result, and the more unhappy one is, the less flexibility occurs. However, this conclusion 
is not justified for several reasons. Theoretically, the outcomes of positive and negative 
emotions do not necessarily lie on the ends of one continuum. In fact, many positive 
psychologists claim that the study of positive aspects of life is different from the mere 
absence of negative outcomes, and requires unique theoretical and empirical work (Gable 





cognitive breadth, it does not necessarily follow that negative emotions decrease 
cognitive breadth. Indeed, some studies find that negative emotions are associated with 
creativity (e.g., Adaman & Blaney, 1995; Goerge & Zhou, 2002). The current study 
examines whether negative emotions have a narrowing effect by comparing the effects of 
positive, neutral, as well as negative emotions.  
Theoretical Predictions 
Theoretical explanations for the effects of moods on cognition differ in the degree 
to which they distinguish between effects of positive and negative emotions. I will review 
the Affect as Information Model, the Mood as Input Model, the Mood Behavior Model, 
the Broaden and Build Theory, and the Dopaminergic Model. 
According to the Affect as Information Model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2007) 
feelings can have informational value. They signal whether a situation is benign or 
problematic. The organism has developed processing patterns that match the 
requirements of the situation. Problematic situations require a careful analysis of the 
situation resulting in analytic, detailed, and local processing. For benign situations, 
individuals can use the dominant strategy that has served them well in the past. As a 
result, people apply heuristics and top-down processing, and process information globally 
and broadly, thereby increasing creativity. The prediction is that overall, positive affect 
increases idea generation and categorization.  
The Mood as Input Model (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993) incorporates an 
affect as information approach (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2007) by predicting that affect 
can be used as information about a situation. Furthermore, the type of judgment 





performance or task enjoyment. More specifically, when using mood as information 
about task performance, positive mood can signal success, which will result in spending 
less effort than when positive mood is used as information about enjoyment. These 
judgments affect perseverance on tasks such as idea generation (Martin et al., 1993). It is 
not clear whether the effect for task perseverance can be generalized to other kinds of 
performance. However, a larger number of ideas and more time spent on the task may 
increase the likelihood of creative ideas (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). The model 
suggests that performance goals moderate the influence of positive and negative emotions 
on idea generation and categorization.  
Another model that integrates the affect as information logic is the Mood 
Behavior Model (Gendolla, 2000).  The model examines the motivating aspects of mood. 
Mood can lead to mood-repair when individuals feel the need to change their mood and 
when instrumental behavior is available and appropriate. Independent of this directive 
influence of mood, mood can be used as information that influences associations and 
cognitive processing. With no performance standard, previous research suggests that 
individuals use their mood to infer how pleasant rather than how successful task 
performance is, and positive mood increases performance (Gendolla & Brinkman, 2005). 
The model emphasizes that mood is but one piece of information about a situation. 
Information given by the task itself, for example, about how difficult it is or via direct 
performance feedback, can reduce the effect of mood as information. Thus, the difficulty 
of a task should moderate the informational value of mood. High task difficulty reduces 
the informational value of mood and thus its effect, and low task difficulty leaves room 





task difficulty moderates the effects of emotions on performance, resulting in no 
difference between positive and negative emotions with difficult tasks, and better 
performance with positive affect and easy tasks.  
An alternative explanation for the moderating role of task difficulty exists. 
Difficult tasks might reduce positive mood. This may reduce the difference between 
positive and negative emotion groups. As a result, the influence of positive emotions may 
differ little from other emotions. However, with easy tasks, no prediction concerning the 
direction of mood effects can be derived from this perspective, whereas the Mood 
Behavior Model suggests that in this case, positive mood increases performance 
(Gendolla & Brinkman, 2005). 
Although the predictions derived from the affect as information logic are often 
similar to the predictions based on the following two models, the underlying explanations 
are quite different. The starting point for the Broaden and Build Theory (Fredrickson, 
1998) is that due to evolutionary pressures, negative emotions are associated with 
specific and narrow thought-action repertoires (Frijda, 1986). However, positive 
emotions cannot as easily be matched with specific behaviors (Frijda, 1986). Whereas the 
actions associated with negative emotions seem to have immediate evolutionary benefits 
(e.g., spitting something out in disgust), the evolutionary advantages of positive emotions 
are less proximal. Positive emotions are good, according to the theory, because they 
broaden thought-action repertoires leading to exploration, openness to novel things, and 
play. As a result of exploration, individuals acquire physical, social, and other resources. 
The experience of positive emotions, as well as the resources acquired through the 





creative, and better at recuperating. Creativity is seen as a result of broad thought 
repertoires, a tendency to explore, and general openness to the unusual. In contrast to 
positive emotions, negative emotions are expected to narrow cognitive breadth 
(Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). Thus, the predictions are similar to the ones from the 
Affect as Information Model: Positive affect increases cognitive breadth, and negative 
affect decreases breadth. 
Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) suggest that mediated by increased levels of 
dopamine in the frontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex, positive affect increases 
flexibility and creativity. The Dopaminergic Model thus makes a similar prediction like 
the previously reviewed models that positive affect increases idea generation and 
categorization. However, no predictions are made for negative affect.  
The goal of this meta-analysis is to determine whether negative emotions narrow 
cognitive breadth. Alternatively, negative emotions might broaden idea generation and 
category breadth, or have no impact on cognitive breadth. To summarize, according to 
the Affect as Information model, the Mood as Input Model, the Mood Behavior Model, 
the Broaden and Build Theory, and the Dopaminergic Model, positive affect increases 
idea generation and categorization. Apart from the latter model, the models also predict 
that negative emotions will decrease idea generation and categorization. According to the 
Mood as Input Model and the Mood Behavior Model, the effects of positive and negative 
emotions may depend on salient goals and task difficulty: Performance goals will 
increase performance under negative mood, and pleasure goals increase performance 
under positive mood. Furthermore, with easy tasks, the outcomes of positive and negative 






Isen and Daubman’s 1984 article “The influence of affect on categorization” is a 
key paper in the area of emotional impacts on cognitive breadth. I searched the ISI Web 
of Science’s data base for papers that cited this key article between 1984 and Sept. 15, 
2007 to gather research reports for this meta-analysis. I read the titles, abstracts, and – if 
necessary – the method section of the resulting 240 papers to identify relevant articles. 
Using the Thesaurus option with ‘Emotional States’ and ‘Classification, Cognitive 
Process’ as search terms, I searched for additional relevant reports in the database of 
PsycInfo (1900 – Sept. 15, 2007). Finally, I followed references in articles to find still 
more papers on the topic.  
Un-published studies were not considered, and thus the estimated average effect 
size might over-estimate the effect of emotions on cognition. Thus, conclusions about the 
magnitude of the estimated effects should be drawn with caution. However, the bias 
should not interfere with findings about the direction of the effects of positive and 
negative emotion on cognitive breadth. 
Experimental studies in which at least two out of three affective states (positive, 
neutral, negative) were aroused in healthy, human adults in a between subjects design 
were considered. In the majority of reports, positive and negative emotions were not 
further specified, but some studies aroused particular emotions (e.g., sadness and 
happiness; Bohner & Schwarz, 1993). Positive and negative emotions have been aroused 
in multiple ways, for example by watching movie clips (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005; Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987), reading statements (Hirt et al., 1996), receiving 





Westermann, Spies, Stahl, and Hesse (1995) describe the occurrence and success of 
various emotion induction procedures meta-analytically. Table 2.1 provides on overview 
of the type of emotion and the emotion inductions in the studies analyzed in this paper. In 
the majority of comparisons, the neutral control group also received a treatment. 
Studies only needed to have one of the outcome variables of interest. Some of the 
studies (categorization studies) required participants to categorize elements into groups or 
to rate whether or how well unusual elements belong to a group (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 
1984). In other studies, participants generated ideas, which could be counted and 
analyzed for the proportion of unusual ideas (idea generation studies; e.g., Hirt, Melton, 
McDonald, & Harackiewicz, 1996). In past research, in both categorization studies and 
idea generation studies, cognitive breadth has been assessed quantitatively (how many 
elements per category or how many ideas) and qualitatively (how unusual are the 
elements in a category or the ideas). The unusualness of ideas or category elements was 
determined by researcher ratings, based on pre-tests, past research, or computations from 
the sample. Table 2.1 provides information for the distribution of outcome variables 
across comparisons and reports. 
Categorization and idea generation are related to research on creativity more 
broadly. However, this analysis was specific to idea generation and categorization, and 
did not include studies of creativity tasks in general, such as Duncker’s candle task 
(1945), or studies with remote associates tasks. Solutions in the latter tasks are either 
correct or incorrect, so that it is not possible to differentiate between the quality and 
quantity of responses. Also, studies of social categorization / stereotyping were not 





of the valence of category elements (e.g., traits; Isen, Niedenthal, & Cantor, 1992), 
whereas in non-social categorization tasks the elements are typically neutral in valence 
(e.g., furniture; Isen & Daubman, 1984).  
A sample of 20 studies published in the English language resulted from these 
efforts. Two articles were dropped, because the measurements of cognitive breadth were 
not sufficiently similar to the rest of the sample. Specifically, Ramon, Doran, and Faust 
(2007) measured reaction times to unusual category members. In this study, no 
significant differences were found between positive and neutral, and neutral and negative 
emotion groups. A second article (Conway & Hassebrauck, 1997) assessed cognitive 
breadth only as the number of categories built from a given set of elements instead of the 
number of elements integrated into one category. Here, positive emotions resulted in 
fewer categories than either neutral or negative emotions. Thus, a total of 18 reports 
containing 25 studies and 68 comparisons are analyzed in this meta-analysis. The 
majority of the studies had college students as the sample (see table 2.1). The median 
publication year was 1996 (1984, 2007). 
To investigate potential moderators for the relationship between emotion and 
cognition, performance goals were coded in 5 categories: As ‘no goal,’ ‘achieve a self-set 
goal,’ ‘do enough,’ ‘do one’s best,’ and ‘do as long as you enjoy.’ For example, a ‘do 
one’s best goal’ was indicated when participants were instructed to ask themselves “Have 
I generated as many uses as I can?” and a ‘do as long as you enjoy’ goal when 
participants were instructed to ask themselves “Do I feel like continuing with this task?” 





Task difficulty was coded on a 3-point scale. In idea generation, low difficulty 
was coded when participants were asked to freely associate given a cue (e.g., the letter 
‘H;’ Isen, Labroo, & Durlach, 2004), medium difficulty when they had to create a list 
according to a topic (e.g., things that fly; Gasper, 2004), and high difficulty when a text 
had to be created (e.g., an argument; Bohner & Schwarz, 1993). In categorization tasks, 
low difficulty was coded when both categories and exemplars were given and had to be 
sorted (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), medium difficulty was coded when either 
categories or exemplars had to be created (e.g., creation of groups of similar TV shows; 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990), and high difficulty when both had to be created. 
The distribution of goals across samples and reports is given in Table 2.1. 
All possible emotion group comparisons were performed: Positive versus neutral, 
neutral versus negative, and positive versus negative. Not all effect sizes are independent 
of each other, because 7 reports - which contributed 57% of all comparisons - contained 3 
emotion groups.  
Average effect sizes were estimated as Hedges g, an unbiased estimate, with the 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis program. For studies that did not report sufficient 
statistics, several estimations were performed. Sample size was estimated by dividing the 
total sample by number of groups. Standard deviations were estimated using the 
information from F-tests or t-tests. For one positive-neutral emotion comparison (Barone, 
2005, study 1), no standard deviation could be estimated in this way. As the author did 
not respond to an email inquiry, the standard deviations were estimated by taking the 
average of four standard deviations provided by Barone, Miniard, and Romeo (2000). 





measured with the same task, and yielding similar means, as in Barone (2005). The four 
standard deviations reported in Barone et al. (2000) have a small range (0.98, 1.2), so that 
I feel quite confident about this estimation procedure.  
Results 
As the effect of emotions on quantitative cognitive breadth can be quite different 
from qualitative breadth (Gasper, 2004; Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, & Martin, 
1997), the total sample of comparisons is split into those concerning the number of ideas 
generated and those concerning the unusualness of ideas and category elements.  
The effects of positive, neutral, and negative emotions on quantitative cognitive 
breadth do not seem to stem from the same population, as the normal quantile-quantile 
plot, a plot of estimated versus actual data points that should result in a straight line if the 
sample stems from one normal distribution, shows deviations from a straight line and 
several comparisons that are outside the 95% confidence interval band (Figure 2.1). By 
splitting the comparisons into the different emotion group comparisons – positive-neutral, 
neutral-negative, and positive-negative – the distributions become somewhat closer to a 
normal distribution (Figures 2.2 – 2.4). The estimated effect sizes for quantitative 
cognitive breadth for each comparison can be seen in Table 2.2. 
A meta-analysis of the effect of emotions on the numbers of ideas generated was 
first conducted on 14 comparisons of positive emotions with neutral emotions. The 
homogeneity test for a fixed effects model was significant, suggesting that the effects 
were heterogeneous and should be combined using a random effects model, Q (13) = 
251.37, p < .001. Compared to neutral emotions, people in positive emotions generated 





p = .04 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.02, 1.41 for a random effects model). The 
results of a fixed effects model are provided in Table 2.3. Boxplots of the standardized 
mean differences for each emotion group comparison are shown in Figure 2.5. Five 
outliers are visible, but they do not skew the results (see Table 2.3). 
Combining the effects for a comparison of neutral with negative emotions, again, 
seems only possible in a random effects model, as the effects are not homogeneous, Q (9) 
= 232.58, p < .001. According to the Broaden and Build Theory of positive emotions, we 
would expect the average effect size to be positive. However, the average effect size is 
negative, g+ = -0.15 (95% CI = -1.14, 0.85; random effects model), and the confidence 
interval includes zero. I paid special attention to the effect of one comparison for neutral 
versus negative emotions on quantitative cognitive breadth, because the boxplot (Figure 
2.5) indicates an outlier on one side of the distribution, which might skew the results. 
Removing this outlier changes the direction of the effect size (g+ = 0.29), but the 
confidence interval for the random effects model still includes zero (see Table 2.3). It 
seems that negative emotions do not necessarily reduce the number of ideas. 
The question remains whether positive and negative emotions differ in their 
likelihood of increasing cognitive breadth. 17 comparisons of positive and negative 
emotions show an average effect size of g+ = 0.35 (95% CI = -0.53, 1.24; random effects 
model). Again, this effect size is not homogeneous, Q (16) = 533.99, p < .001, suggesting 
that the effects should not be combined other than in a random effects model. Excluding 
two outliers based on the boxplot (Figure 2.5) does not change this result (Table 2.3). 






All previous effects were heterogeneous, and it is possible to identify a moderator 
in the relationship between emotions and quantitative cognitive breadth. According to the 
Mood as Input Model (e.g., Martin et al., 1993), emotions should have different effects 
on performance, depending on how they are interpreted in the situation. According to the 
Mood as Input Model, doing one’s best should result in a better performance with 
negative emotions, and doing as long as one enjoys the task should result in more ideas 
with positive emotions. Table 2.4 provides an overview of the results for each emotion 
group comparison and all emotion groups combined. 
For positive compared to neutral emotions, performance goals only marginally 
moderated the positive average effect, Q (4) = 8.17, p = .09 (mixed effects model), and 
did not entirely reduce the heterogeneity in the effect size sample. Performance goals to 
‘do one’s best,’ or to ‘do enough’ yield negative effect sizes (g+s = -0.89, -0.21, 
respectively) and to ‘achieve a self-set goal,’ ‘no goal’ or to ‘do as long as you enjoy’ or 
resulted in positive effect sizes (g+s = 0.31, 0.69, 3.18, respectively).  
For neutral compared to negative emotions, performance goals were a significant 
moderator, Q (4) = 9.88, p = .04 (mixed effects model). Although performance goals did 
not entirely explain the heterogeneity in the sample, goals to ‘do one’s best,’ to ‘do 
enough,’ or to ‘achieve a self-set goal’ resulted in negative effect sizes (g+s = -2.31 , -
0.18, -1.05 respectively), and ‘no goal’ as well as ‘do as long as you enjoy’ in positive 
effect sizes (g+s = 0.33, 1.44 respectively).  
The results are similar for the comparison of positive and negative emotions. 
Performance goals do not entirely reduce the heterogeneity in the sample, but they 





Again, performance goals to ‘do one’s best,’ to ‘do enough,’ or to ‘achieve a self-set 
goal’ result in negative effect sizes (g+s = -2.97, -1.78, -0.74, respectively), and ‘no goal’ 
as well as to ‘do as long as you enjoy’ resulted in positive effects (g+s = 0.42, 4.17, 
respectively). The results do not change when one study at a time is removed, as seen in 
Figure 2.6. 
As the results differ little across emotion group comparisons – positive/neutral, 
neutral/negative, and positive/negative – they can be combined (see Figure 2.7). Overall, 
performance goals significantly moderate the relationship between emotion and idea 
generation, Q (4) = 37.38, p < .001. The effect for ‘do best’ is g+ = -2.16 (95% CI = -
3.97, -0.36), for ‘do enough’ is g+ = -0.88 (95% CI = -1.85, 0.10) and for ‘achieve a 
specific number’ is g+ = -0.49 (95% CI = -1.30, 0.33). The effect sizes for ‘no goal’ is g+ 
= 0.52 (95% CI = 0.06, 0.98) and for the goal ‘do as long as you enjoy’ is g+ = 3.19 (95% 
CI = 1.93, 4.45). The motivation to do well increases idea generation with negative 
emotions. When enjoyment goals are salient or no goals are specified, positive affect 
results in more cognitive breadth. Yet a significant amount of heterogeneity remains in 
the sample. Unfortunately, task difficulty does not vary across the studies, and so its 
effect as a moderator cannot be examined. 
To summarize the findings for quantitative cognitive breadth, the effect sizes of 
positive, neutral, and negative emotions on quantitative cognitive breadth are quite 
heterogeneous. This means that the influence of emotions on cognitive breadth is 
influenced by other variables. Not all of the heterogeneity can be explained by taking 
performance goals as a moderator into account. When the enjoyment of a task is the goal, 





However, when high performance is the goal, negative emotions result in more creativity. 
This finding is robust to removing one study at a time. Accounting for the heterogeneity 
in a random effects model shows that positive emotions increase cognitive breadth 
compared to neutral emotions. Negative emotions, however, do not necessarily reduce 
quantitative idea generation performance.  
For qualitative cognitive breadth, the distribution of the effect sizes is more 
normal than seen with the previous effects (Figure 2.8). The distribution has several 
bumps. For easy comparison to the previous results, the sample is split into three emotion 
group comparisons. The distribution of the effects for each particular emotion group 
comparison - similar to the effects of all three emotion group comparisons combined - on 
qualitative cognitive breadth seem normal, but have outliers and are bumpy (Figures 1.9 
– 1.11), which indicates that important moderators might impact the effects. However, 
the sample size for the comparison of neutral versus negative, and positive versus 
negative are quite small, so conclusions must be drawn with caution. The effect size 
estimates for qualitative cognitive breadth are provided in Table 2.5. 
To test the effect of positive compared to neutral emotions on unusualness of 
subjects’ responses, a meta-analysis was conducted on 17 comparisons. Compared to 
neutral emotions, people experiencing positive emotions generated more unusual ideas, 
and showed a propensity to include unusual elements as category members, g+ = 0.55, p < 
.001 (95% CI = 0.44, 0.66, fixed effects model). The homogeneity test was 
nonsignificant, suggesting that the effects were homogeneous and could be combined, Q 
(16) = 23.51, p = .10. Table 2.6 shows that the results for a random effects model would 





two emotion group comparisons (Figure 2.12). The results do not change if one study at a 
time is removed from the analysis (Figure 2.13). 
Implied in past research is the idea that the more positive the feeling, the more 
creative the ideas and the more inclusive the categories. However, the average effect size 
of 4 studies comparing neutral and negative emotions is, similar to the findings for 
quantity of cognitive breadth, negative with g+ = -0.34 (95% CI = -.59, -0.09; fixed 
effects model) and homogeneous, Q (3) = 4.54, p = .21. The results are similar with a 
random effects model (Table 2.6) and robust (Figure 2.13). It seems that, like positive 
emotions, negative emotions increase novel ideas.  
The question remains whether positive and negative emotions differ in the 
likelihood to increasing cognitive breadth. Six comparisons of positive and negative 
emotions show an average effect size of g+ = 0.53 (95% CI = 0.34, 0.71; fixed effects 
model). Again, this finding is similar for quantitative cognitive breadth. The effect size is 
not homogeneous, Q (5) = 36.12, p < .001, suggesting that the effects should not be 
combined. Figure 2.13 displays how the effect sizes change by removing one study at a 
time. A random effects model would be more appropriate.  
Including task difficulty as a continuous moderator shows that the more difficult 
the task, the less the difference between positive and negative emotions in increasing idea 
generation and categorization breadth, b = -.49 (95% CI = -.78, -.22), z = -3.55, p < .001 
(Figure 2.14). The slope is negative, indicating that with easier tasks, positive emotions 
improve performance over negative emotions. However, a significant amount of 





dependent variable, no studies are included in the sample that allow an analysis of 
different performance goals. 
As it is not possible to sufficiently reduce heterogeneity with these moderators, a 
random effects model is more appropriate for the comparison of positive and negative 
emotions. A random effects model results in an effect size of g+ = 0.50. The 95% 
confidence interval is wide and includes zero (-0.02, 1.01). It therefore seems that 
negative emotions can operate quite similarly to positive emotions in increasing creativity 
in idea generation and category breadth for unusual category exemplars.  
To summarize the findings for qualitative cognitive breadth, unusual idea 
generation seems more likely under positive than neutral emotion conditions. Similarly, 
negative emotions increase qualitative cognitive breadth compared to neutral emotions. 
These comparisons were homogeneous, suggesting that they are not moderated by other 
variables. These results are robust when using different models (fixed or random effects 
model), or excluding one study at a time. Comparing positive to negative emotions shows 
that positive emotions are as powerful as negative emotions in increasing the generation 
of unusual ideas and acceptance of unusual category members. However, this comparison 
is heterogeneous, and the direction of the effect therefore seems to depend on other 
variables. We found that the difference between positive and negative emotions is more 
pronounced with easy tasks, but other variables might additionally influence whether 
positive or negative emotions improve qualitative cognitive breadth. 
Discussion 
The results of this meta-analysis partially support the claims of the Broaden and 





the broadening effect of positive emotions on cognition. Compared to neutral emotions, 
positive affect increases the number of ideas generated and the unusualness of ideas and 
category members. Regarding the unusualness of ideas and category members, the effect 
does not seem to be influenced by moderators. However, this finding only holds when 
comparing positive to neutral emotions. Contrary to the common belief, negative 
emotions can result in equal or more cognitive breadth compared to positive emotions. 
Regarding the quality of cognitive breadth, this effect does not seem to depend on 
situational variables.  
When comparing positive to negative emotions, the Broaden and Build Model and 
the Affect as Information Model do not necessarily find support. In contrast to the 
implications of the previous research, negative emotions do not necessarily have the 
opposite effect of positive emotions. Indeed, negative emotions can be equally powerful 
as positive emotions in increasing cognitive breadth. The meta-analytic findings support 
the idea that positive and negative emotions are different processes with outcomes that do 
not lie on opposite ends of the same continuum.  
When comparing positive to negative emotions, the outcomes for cognitive 
breadth seem to be influenced by different variables, as indicated by a high level of 
heterogeneity in the effect sizes. Performance goals can explain some of the variance for 
quantitative idea generation and categorization. With ‘enjoy task’ goals, positive 
emotions increase performance, and negative emotions decrease performance. With ‘do 
you best’ goals, however, negative emotions result in more ideas. Performance goals did 





effect on the relationship between emotions and unusualness of ideas and category 
members. The results support the Mood as Input Model. 
A moderator of the emotions-cognition relationship for qualitative performance is 
task difficulty. With easy tasks, the difference between positive and negative emotions 
can be larger than with difficult tasks. As only few comparisons were used in this 
analysis, conclusions cannot be drawn with great confidence. Currently, the results 
support the Mood Behavior Model. Task difficulty did not vary for quantitative 
performance, so that it remains unclear how task difficulty affects the number of 
generated ideas.  
After including performance goals and task difficulty, a significant amount of 
heterogeneity in the effect sizes remains, indicating that other moderators could impact 
the effect of positive and negative emotions on cognitive breadth. This suggests that the 
influence of positive compared to negative emotions on cognitive breadth is not robust, 
and may vary across situations. Moderators that appear in the literature, but that could not 
be examined meta-analytically due to a lack of sufficient studies, are the perceived 
desirability of creative responses (Gasper, 2004) and a focus on similarities or differences 
when generating ideas (Göritz & Moser, 2003; Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990).  
Given that positive compared to negative emotions do not always increase 
associative flexibility, one could conclude that arousal rather than specific emotions 
increases creativity. However, Isen and Daubman (1984) assessed participants’ arousal 
with two scales and found either no difference between the emotion and control group 
(alert-unaware scale), or differences that did not match the pattern of findings for 





arousal alone given that under the same circumstances, positive and negative emotions 
operate in different directions, as seen with the case of performance goals.  
A variety of explanations for the underlying process of emotions on cognition 
have been suggested. For example, positive emotions might result in broader categories 
because positive affect cues a large amount of material, and the material is organized in 
more integrated categories to facilitate information processing (Isen & Daubman, 1984). 
This explanation seems to fit with the finding that positive emotions can increase the 
application of heuristics, which also facilitate information processing (Isen, Means, 
Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). However, other research indicates that emotions do not affect 
the amount of available material, but rather how this material is used (Gasper, 2004).  
Although the mechanisms for positive or negative emotions are not fully 
understood, many researchers agree that even if positive and negative emotions’ 
outcomes are similar, the underlying processes might not be the same (Adaman & 
Blaney, 1995; Isen & Daubman, 1984; Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999). For example, 
Ramon et al. (2007) show evidence that positive and negative emotions affect particular 
brain hemispheres, resulting in different categorization strategies. Recent research 
suggests that positive emotions improve creativity by increasing unusual associations, but 
negative emotions do so through persistence (De Dreu et al., 2008). Clearly, more work is 
required to understand the processes underlying the relationship of emotions on cognitive 
breadth. Likely, the processes for negative and positive emotions will be different from 







Past research has shown the many positive outcomes of positive affect 
(Lyubomirski et al., 2005). Implied in this research is the idea that negative affect has 
opposite effects. Some models explicitly predict that positive emotions broaden cognition 
and negative emotions narrow cognition (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). However, this 
meta-analysis shows that negative emotions do not result in a mirror image outcome of 
positive emotions. For the case of cognitive breadth in idea generation and categorization, 
the analysis confirmed that happy individuals come up with more, and more unusual, 
ideas, and include more unusual members in a category. However, the analysis also 
showed that negative emotions can broaden cognition in a similar way as positive 
emotions. When compared to neutral affect, the influence of positive as well as negative 
emotions on the unusualness of ideas and category members included in a category do 
not seem to vary with different situations. Thus, the outcomes of positive and negative 
emotions do not lie on one continuum, as often implied implicitly in the literature of 
positive emotions. Instead, the effect of positive and negative emotions on cognitive 
breadth can be similar to each other. Comparisons of negative and positive emotions 
show that which emotion increases cognitive breadth more is influenced by situational 
variables. Likely, positive and negative emotions trigger different processes that are 






Sample characteristics across comparisons and reports 
Study characteristic Out of 68 
comparisons 




 Pos vs. nt 46% 12 reports 
 Nt vs. neg 21 % 7 reports 
 Pos vs. neg 34% 11 reports 
Specific emotion   
 Pos, neg affect  53% 11 reports 
 'happy' and 'sad'  37% Bohner & Schwarz, 1993; Davis et al., 2007; 
Gasper, 2004; Hirt et al., 1996; Hirt et al., 
1997 
 'elated' and 'depressed'  6% Adaman & Blaney, 1995 
 5 specific emotions 4% Fredrickson & Branigan 
Emotion induction   
 Movie 44% 8 reports 
 Velten 32% Goritz & Moser, 2003; Murray et al., 1990; 
Hirt et al., 1996 
 Essay 7% Bohner & Schwarz, 1993; Gasper, 2004; 
Mikulincer & Sheffi, 2000 
 Music 6% Adaman & Blaney, 1995 
 Candy 3% Barone et al., 2000; Isen & Daubman, 1984 
 Refreshments 3% Isen et al., 2004 
 Feedback 3% Barone & Miniard, 2002; Barone et al., 2000 
 Illumination 2% Baron et al., 1992 
Control group   






Table 2.1 (continued) 
Dependent variable   
 Categorization 16% 6 reports 
 Idea generation 84% 12 reports 
 Quantity 60% 10 reports 
 Quality 40% 13 reports 
Population, Setting   
 Students, lab 91% 17 reports 
 Unknown, Internet  9% Goritz & Moser, 2003 
Goal    
 No goal 62% 15 reports 
 Enjoy goal 12% Hirt et al., 1996; Hirt et al., 1997; Martin et 
al., 1993; Sanna et al., 1996; 
 Do best 10% Davis et al., 2007; Hirt et al., 1997; Sanna et 
al., 1996 
 Multiple goals 6% Hirt et al., 1996; Hirt et al., 1997 
 Do enough  6% Hirt et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1993 
 Self-set goal 4% Davis et al., 2007 
Task difficulty   
 Easy 19% 7 reports 
 Medium 79% 10 reports 
 Hard 1% Bohner & Schwarz, 1993 
Notes. Pos = positive, nt = neutral, neg = negative.  
Not all comparisons are independent, so that the sum of the percentages of comparisons 






Effect size estimates for quantitative cognitive breadth 
Author Year N Emotions Hedges 
g 
95% CI Goal 
Sanna, Turley, & Mark 1996 66 Pos-nt -2.73 -3.39 -2.06 best 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos-nt -0.21 -0.79 0.37 enough 
Goritz & Moser 2003 68 Pos-nt -0.18 -0.65 0.29 no goal 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & 
Sujan 
1990 78 Pos-nt 0.00 -0.44 0.44 no goal 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & 
Sujan 
1990 78 Pos-nt 0.17 -0.27 0.61 no goal 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Pos-nt 0.30 -0.40 1.00 number 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & 
Sujan 
1990 41 Pos-nt 0.64 0.02 1.25 no goal 
Adaman & Blaney 1995 48 Pos-nt 0.68 0.10 1.25 no goal 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Pos-nt 0.97 0.23 1.71 best 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos-nt 0.99 0.37 1.61 no goal 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & 
Sujan 
1990 41 Pos-nt 1.00 0.36 1.63 no goal 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos-nt 1.54 0.88 2.21 enjoy 
Fredrickson & Branigan 2005 98 Pos-nt 2.22 1.72 2.72 no goal 
Sanna, Turley, & Mark 1996 66 Pos-nt 4.76 3.82 5.70 enjoy 
Sanna, Turley, & Mark 1996 66 Nt-neg -4.13 -4.99 -3.28 best 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Nt-neg -1.02 -1.76 -0.28 number 
Adaman & Blaney 1995 48 Nt-neg -0.98 -1.57 -0.39 no goal 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Nt-neg -0.43 -1.14 0.27 best 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 33 Nt-neg -0.18 -0.88 0.53 enough 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Nt-neg -0.06 -0.64 0.52 no goal 







Table 2.2 (continued) 
Sanna, Turley, & Mark 1996 66 Pos_neg -6.86 -8.12 -5.60 best 
Martin, Ward, Achee, & 
Wyer 
1993 24 Pos_neg -3.16 -4.34 -1.98 enough 
Hirt, Levine, McDonald, 
Melton, & Martin  
1997 30 Pos_neg -2.54 -3.49 -1.59 best 
Martin, Ward, Achee, & 
Wyer 
1993 24 Pos_neg -2.24 -3.23 -1.24 no goal 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Pos_neg -0.72 -1.44 0.00 number 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos_neg -0.38 -0.97 0.20 enough 
Gasper 2004 120 Pos_neg -0.04 -0.39 0.32 no goal 
Gasper 2004 108 Pos_neg 0.01 -0.36 0.39 no goal 
Goritz & Moser 2003 77 Pos_neg 0.03 -0.41 0.47 no goal 
Gasper 2004 124 Pos_neg 0.21 -0.14 0.56 no goal 
Davis, Kirby, & Curtis 2007 30 Pos_neg 0.54 -0.17 1.25 best 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos_neg 0.91 0.29 1.52 no goal 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 
1996 44 Pos_neg 2.11 1.38 2.84 enjoy 
Martin, Ward, Achee, & 
Wyer 
1993 24 Pos_neg 2.59 1.53 3.66 enjoy 
Fredrickson & Branigan 2005 98 Pos_neg 3.85 3.18 4.52 no goal 
Hirt, Levine, McDonald, 
Melton, & Martin  
1997 30 Pos_neg 4.77 3.38 6.17 enjoy 
Sanna, Turley, & Mark 1996 66 Pos_neg 7.04 5.75 8.34 enjoy 






Average effect size estimate and 95% confidence interval for quantitative cognitive 
breadth by emotion group comparison for different models 
Emotion groups Model Hedges g+ 95% CI df Homogeneity (QW) 
Pos vs. nt Fixed 0.54 0.38, 0.69 13 251.37*** 
  (0.60) (0.44, 0.77) (11) (81.41***) 
 Random 0.72 0.02, 1.41   
  (0.68) (0.23, 1.13)   
Nt vs. neg Fixed 0.22 0.02, 0.41 9 232.58*** 
  (0.45) (0.26, 0.65) (8) (126.92***) 
 Random -0.15 -1.14, 0.85   
  (0.29) (-0.51, 1.09)   
Pos vs. neg Fixed 0.27 0.13, 0.42 16 533.99*** 
  (0.28) (0.13, 0.43) (14) (306.22***) 
 Random 0.35 -0.53, 1.24   
  (0.38) (-0.35, 1.11)   
Notes.  Pos = positive, nt = neutral, neg = negative. 
Estimates when excluding outlier comparisons are given in parenthesis. 






Average effect size estimate, 95% confidence interval, and homogeneity test for 








95% CI Homogeneity within each 
class (QWi) 
Pos vs. nt  8.17†     
 Do best  2 -0.89 -4.57, 2.80 52.66*** 
 Do enough  1 -0.21 -0.80, 0.38 n/a 
 Self-set  1 0.31 -0.41, 1.03 n/a 
 No goal  8 0.69 0.12, 1.26 64.61*** 
 Enjoy  2 3.18 -0.01, 6.36 29.66*** 
Nt vs. neg  9.88*     
 Do best  2 -2.31 -5.97, 1.36 42.43*** 
 Do enough  1 -0.18 -0.91, 0.55 n/a 
 Self-set  1 -1.05 -1.81, -0.28 n/a 
 No goal  4 0.33 -0.95, 1.61 68.93*** 
 Enjoy  2 1.44 -0.26, 3.14 15.33*** 
Pos vs. 
neg 
 21.87***     
 Do best  3 -2.97 -7.02, 1.08 104.69*** 
 Do enough  2 -1.78 -4.60, 1.04 17.20*** 
 Self-set  1 -0.74 -1.48, 0.001 n/a 
 No goal  7 0.42 -0.46, 1.30 144.55*** 
 Enjoy  4 4.17 1.97, 6.34 47.96*** 
All  37.38***     
 Do best  7 -2.16 -3.97, -0.36 205.49*** 
 Do enough  4 -0.88 -1.85, 0.10 21.50*** 
 Self-set  3 -0.49 -1.30, 0.33 7.20* 
 No goal  19 0.52 0.06, 0.98 283.24*** 
 Enjoy  8 3.19 1.93, 4.45 128.09*** 
Notes.  Pos = positive, nt = neutral, neg = negative. 






Effect size estimates for qualitative cognitive breadth 
Author Year N Emotions Hedges g 95% CI 
Task 
difficulty 
Barone 2005 109 Pos-nt 0.14 -0.23 0.52 1 
Isen, Labroo, & Durlach 2004 46 Pos-nt 0.27 -0.42 0.96 1 
Barone & Miniard 2002 166 Pos-nt 0.29 -0.01 0.59 1 
Adaman & Blaney 1995 48 Pos-nt 0.37 -0.19 0.93 2 
Isen & Daubman 1984 70 Pos-nt 0.43 -0.04 0.90 1 
Mikulincer & Sheffi 2000 110 Pos-nt 0.44 0.07 0.82 1 
Barone & Miniard 2000 67 Pos-nt 0.44 -0.04 0.92 1 
Isen & Daubman 1984 70 Pos-nt 0.50 0.02 0.98 1 
Barone 2005 158 Pos-nt 0.50 0.18 0.81 1 
Goritz & Moser 2003 49 Pos-nt 0.51 -0.13 1.16 2 
Isen, Labroo, & Durlach 2004 62 Pos-nt 0.59 0.09 1.09 1 
Barone & Miniard 2000 71 Pos-nt 0.62 0.15 1.09 1 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 1996 130 Pos-nt 0.80 0.44 1.15 2 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan 1990 78 Pos-nt 0.90 0.44 1.36 2 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan 1990 41 Pos-nt 0.98 0.34 1.62 2 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan 1990 41 Pos-nt 1.06 0.42 1.71 2 
Murray, Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan 1990 78 Pos-nt 1.13 0.65 1.60 2 
Adaman & Blaney 1995 48 Nt-neg -0.78 -1.36 -0.20 2 
Goritz & Moser 2003 30 Nt-neg -0.48 -1.20 0.24 2 
Isen & Daubman 1984 55 Nt-neg -0.46 -1.01 0.08 1 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 1996 130 Nt-neg -0.10 -0.44 0.24 2 
Bohner & Schwarz 1993 88 Pos_neg -0.06 -0.48 0.35 3 
Isen & Daubman 1984 57 Pos_neg 0.03 -0.50 0.56 1 
Goritz & Moser 2003 55 Pos_neg 0.03 -0.52 0.59 2 
Hirt, Levine, McDonald, 
Melton, & Martin  1997 60 Pos_neg 0.59 0.08 1.10 2 
Hirt, Melton, McDonald, & 
Harackiewicz 1996 130 Pos_neg 0.70 0.34 1.05 2 
Baron, Rea, & Daniels 1992 92 Pos_neg 1.62 1.16 2.09 1 
Notes. Pos = positive, nt = neutral, neg = negative.  






Average effect size estimate, 95% confidence interval, and homogeneity test for 





95% CI df Homogeneity (QW) 
Pos vs. nt Fixed 0.55 0.44, 0.66 16 23.51, n.s. 
 Random 0.57 0.43, 0.70   
Nt vs. neg Fixed -0.34 -.59, -0.09 3 4.54, n.s. 
 Random -0.40 -0.72, -0.07   
Pos vs. neg Fixed 0.53 0.34, 0.71 5 36.12*** 
 Random 0.50 -0.02, 1.01   
Notes. Pos = positive, nt = neutral, neg = negative.   












Figure 2.2. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for quantitative cognitive 





Figure 2.3. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for quantitative cognitive 









Figure 2.4. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for quantitative cognitive 






Figure 2.5. Boxplot of standardized mean differences for quantitative cognitive breadth. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.7. Boxplot of standardized mean differences for quantitative cognitive breadth 
by performance goals. The number of comparisons per goal group is indicated. 
Best = do your best goal, enough = do enough goal, number = self-set number goal, and 
enjoy = enjoy task goal.
Goal:    Best             Enough         Self-set         No goal          Enjoy 











Figure 2.9. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for qualitative cognitive 





Figure 2.10. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for qualitative cognitive 





Figure 2.11. Normal q-q plot of standardized mean differences for qualitative cognitive 






Figure 2.12. Boxplot of standardized mean differences for qualitative cognitive breadth. 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.14. Regression of task difficulty on standardized mean differences. Task 
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Happiness Impairs Cognitive Flexibility in Reversal Learning 
 
Daily life involves dealing with change; the price of gas goes up, the grocery store 
no longer carries your favorite yogurt, your boss develops a new attitude about your 
performance. To deal with such events, individuals need to detect changes and adapt their 
behavior accordingly. In this study, we examine the role of emotions in the ability to 
learn changes in reward contingencies using a reversal learning paradigm. There is ample 
evidence that emotions aroused in one context can spill over to a different situation and 
influence behavior (so-called incidental emotions; Bodenhausen, 1993). For example, a 
large body of research on emotions and creative behaviors shows that positive affect 
generally improves flexibility in the creativity domain (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; 
Davis, 2008). However, research on the influence of emotions on executive functions, 
such as reversal learning, is less advanced.  
In a reversal learning paradigm, one of two stimuli is associated with a reward. 
The stimulus that is reinforced changes throughout the task (so-called reversals; e.g., 
Rolls, 2004). The ability to learn reversals is important for adapting to changes in rewards 
regarding basic behaviors, such as the acquisition of tasty foods, as well as social 
situations. For example, Kringelbach and Rolls (2003) studied reversal learning for  






changing facial expressions, which is associated with increased activity in the 
orbitofrontal and the anterior cingulate cortices.   
To our knowledge, no study has investigated how reversal learning is influenced 
by incidental emotions. We consider predictions derived from several models: the Mood 
Behavior Model, Capacity Theories, and the Dopaminergic Model. We also propose a 
differentiation of the Dopaminergic Model (see Table 3.1). Models with predictions 
specifically regarding flexibility in the creativity domain (Broaden and Build Model; 
Fredrickson, 1998) are not considered. 
According to the Mood Behavior Model (Gendolla, 2000), incidental emotions 
may not influence reversal learning because of the performance feedback inherent in the 
task. Although emotions can be used as a source of information about task performance 
and influence task effort (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), the informational value of incidental 
emotions is negligible when the task provides sufficient performance feedback (Gendolla, 
2000). 
According to Capacity Theories (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989), performance will 
be impaired after emotion induction because of the cognitive load produced by emotions. 
As an executive function task, reversal learning should be sensitive to reduced cognitive 
resources.  
According to the Dopaminergic Model (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999), positive 
affect generally enhances cognitive flexibility. Ashby et al. (1999) suggest that positive 
affect increases dopamine in the frontal cortex and the anterior cingulated cortex, with 
increased dopamine improving creativity, task switching, and flexibility. Therefore, 
reversal learning should be facilitated under positive affect.  






We propose a differentiation of the Dopaminergic Model by taking into account 
different types of cognitive flexibility. Cognitive flexibility is not a unitary concept (e.g., 
Frick, Guilford, Christensen, & Merrifield, 1959). Controlled switching processes could 
be different from creative cognitive flexibility, which requires set-breaking and broad 
associations (Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Reversal learning requires executive 
control, and emotions may have different consequences for executive function tasks than 
for creative behaviors (Mitchell & Philips, 2007). Furthermore, although dopamine is 
associated with positive affect and increased creativity (Ashby et al., 1999), dopamine 
impairs reversal learning (Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007). Thus, a 
differentiated version of the Dopaminergic Model predicts that emotions facilitate 
different types of flexibility, e.g., emotions that typically improve flexibility in creativity 
tasks will reduce reversal learning. 
In addition to differentiating among types of flexibility, the Dopaminergic Model 
may also require specification regarding the independent variable, positive emotion, 
because the influence of emotions of the same valence on flexibility might differ. For 
example, studies on flexibility in creative tasks show that emotions of different activation 
level differ in their effect on flexibility. Emotions can be differentiated according to the 
hedonic value (positive or negative) as well as the activation or arousal level (e.g., 
Posner, Russell, & Peterson, 2005). Although an emotion (e.g., happiness) could be more 
or less activating in different situations, an emotion might be more activating on average 
than a different emotion (e.g., relaxedness). For example, in a factor analysis of mood 
states, happiness, elation, and excitement loaded on a different factor than calm, relaxed, 
and at ease (De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). Generally, performance at medium levels 






of arousal may increase activity and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). However, at 
low levels of arousal, organisms may be inactive, and at very high levels of arousal, 
information processing capacities may also be reduced. According to the Dual Pathway 
to Creativity Model (De Dreu et al., 2008), medium levels of arousal caused by higher 
activation emotions may improve creativity in different ways depending on the valence of 
the emotion. For positive emotions, creativity is facilitated through flexibility in 
associations and for negative emotions through persistence (De Dreu et al., 2008). Low 
activation emotions, however, do not improve creativity (Baas, et al., 2008). Given the 
different influence of emotions of different activation levels on flexibility in the creativity 
domain, activation level may also be important for flexibility in other domains, such as 
learning reward contingencies. 
In a recent meta-analysis on the influence of emotions on creativity (Baas et al., 
2008), emotions were furthermore classified according to associated approach and 
avoidance tendencies. For example, successfully approaching an object or target is 
associated with happiness, but unsuccessfully approaching is associated with sadness. 
Successfully avoiding something results in relaxedness, but unsuccessfully avoiding 
something results in being tense (e.g., Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). That positive 
and negative emotions associated with approach/avoidance have different effects on 
cognitive flexibility in creativity has been explained with the attentional focus associated 
with approach and avoidance (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2005). Promotion may enhance 
broad attention resulting in more flexibility in creativity tasks with promotion, whereas 
prevention may narrow attention and result in less creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001). 






Differences in approach/avoidance associated with an emotion may be relevant for 
flexibility in reversal learning as well. 
Emotions of the same valence may also influence behavior in subsequent 
situations differently as a result of underlying appraisals associated with the emotions.  
For example, fear is associated with being less certain about the situation than with 
sadness or anger (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). According to the Mood as Information 
Model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2007), affective states signal which behavior is 
appropriate to meet the requirements of a situation. In the Appraisal Tendency 
Framework, this logic is applied to specific emotions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). 
Differences in risk perceptions after anger or fear induction have therefore been attributed 
to associated differences in certainty appraisals (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Various 
appraisals for various negative as well as positive emotions have been identified (e.g., 
Tong, 2008). Appraisals of control and certainty may be particularly relevant for reversal 
learning. With high control, individuals may not feel the need to identify reward 
contingencies. However, low control may indicate that it is important to increase 
predictability by understanding changes in reward contingencies. Therefore, we suggest 
that emotions of the same valence with different appraisals may also influence reversal 
learning differently.  
Present Study 
 To examine the role of different positive and negative emotions on reversal 
learning, we conducted an experiment with four emotions (sadness, worry, happiness, 
and relief) and a control condition. The emotions differ in valence but also in activation 
level and associated approach/avoidance tendencies. Happiness and relief were selected 






as positive emotions; worry and sadness as negative. In line with previous research, 
happiness and worry can be classified as higher in activation and sadness as lower 
(compare De Dreu et al., 2008). Finally, happiness and sadness can be associated with 
approach, whereas relief and worry can be associated with avoidance (Carver, 2009; 
Higgins et al., 1997).  
The emotions can also be differentiated according to underlying appraisals. 
Happiness is typically associated with pleasantness, certainty, and perceived control (e.g., 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Happiness can additionally be characterized by believing that 
the world is good and fair, high self-regard, social appropriateness, and change (Tong, 
2008). Relief may be characterized by ascribing agency to circumstances, perceiving 
little autonomy, and change (Tong, 2008). Sadness is associated with unpleasantness, 
little responsibility, and little situational control (compare Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Worry is characterized by high unexpectedness, goal obstructiveness, external causation, 
and low coping ability (Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). Thus, the emotions differ on a variety 
of appraisals. As discussed in the previous section, differences in control appraisals may 
be particularly relevant for reversal learning, and happiness is relatively higher in 
perceived control than relief, sadness, and worry.  
Differences in reversal learning profiles for combinations of happiness, relief, 
worry, and sadness may indicate which underlying dimension (activation, 
approach/avoidance) or appraisal (e.g., control) is relevant for reversal learning. This 
knowledge will be useful for generalizing the findings to other emotions and for theory 
building. 






According to the Mood Behavior Model, the four emotion conditions will not 
differ from the control conditions, because emotions have little informational value when 
the task itself provides sufficient performance feedback. Capacity Theories predict that 
emotions will reduce regulative flexibility compared to the control condition, because 
emotions increase cognitive load. According to the Dopaminergic Model, happiness and 
relief will improve regulative flexibility because positive emotions generally improve 
cognitive flexibility, but the model does not make predictions for negative emotions. 
Finally, according to the Differentiated Dopaminergic Model, happiness will reduce 
reversal learning because, mediated by increased dopamine, happiness impairs controlled 




Seventy-seven participants1 (40 female, M age = 18.9) from a large Midwestern 
university participated in the study for partial course credit. The majority of the 
participants were Caucasian (75%), and some were Asian/Asian-American (16%), 
Latino/a (4%), African-American (1%), and of other ethnicities (4%).  
Procedure 
Participants were told:  
“This study has two parts. First, we are interested in characteristics of you, such 
as gender and age, and your performance on a creative writing task. In the second part, 
we will ask you to do a reaction time measure on the computer.”  






Participants were randomly assigned to one of the emotion conditions (happy, 
relieved, sad, or worried) or the control condition. Participants had ten minutes to 
complete demographic questionnaires and to write an emotion arousing essay 
(participants could not precede until ten minutes passed). A feeling thermometer was then 
administered to assess current emotions, followed by the computerized Reversal Learning 
Task (15 minutes). The experimenter stayed with participants during the practice trials of 
the task to answer questions. At the end of the study, participants were debriefed. 
Measures 
Emotion Arousal. We employed the method of life event essays to induce 
emotion. The instructions for the happy condition read “Remember a recent event in your 
life that made you feel HAPPY and POSITIVE. Visualize the event in your mind, 
imagine the event vividly. Try to re-experience the original perceptions, sensations, and 
affective reactions. Write down the imagined event and elaborate on your thoughts and 
feelings.” ‘Happy’ was replaced with ‘relieved,’ ‘worried,’ or ‘sad,’ and, in the worried 
and sad condition, ‘positive’ was replaced with ‘negative.’ Control condition participants 
were asked to write about going to the drug store.  
Mood assessment. After the emotion arousal, participants were asked to indicate 
how they felt, at this moment, on five 9-point items anchored with “very bad - very 
good,” “irritable – pleased,” “happy – sad,” “depressed – relieved,” “calm – worried,” 
respectively. 
 Reversal Learning Task. In the Reversal Learning Task, participants saw two 
stimuli and selected the one that had a higher chance of being ‘correct.’ Unknown to 
participants, the probability of a stimulus being correct was 80%. Participants learned 






which stimulus was correct through feedback (rule learning). The stimulus that was 
correct changed twice (first and second reversal learning). Participants were told that the 
correct stimulus can change, but not how often or when. We used the E-prime script of 
Waltz and Gold (2007). Stimuli were grey-scale fractals. Participants needed to select the 
correct stimulus in nine trials out of ten (programmed in blocks of five) before the pattern 
changed. If the participant did not reach this criterion, the pattern changed after the 50th 
trial. The program allowed up to two reversals. Participants repeated the task three times 
with different stimulus pairs.  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Participants differed in their emotion ratings across conditions.2 A mixed analysis 
of variance with the five feeling thermometer items as repeated measures and emotion 
condition as the between factor showed a main effect of condition, F(4, 71) = 4.36, p = 
.003, that was qualified by an interaction with rated emotion, F(16, 284) = 1.89, p = .022. 
Participants in the positive conditions felt more positive (6.65) than participants in the 
negative (5.41) conditions, t(58) = 3.39, p = .001. The difference between the negative 
and the neutral (6.23) conditions approached significance, t(41) = 1.75, p = .088. The 
neutral condition did not result in significantly less positive feelings than the positive 
conditions, t(47) = 1.09, p = .281.  
Participants in the happy condition felt as happy (‘sad’ was reverse coded) as in 
the relieved condition (6.19; 6.29), t(31) = 0.12, p = .902, and also as relieved (6.50; 
6.65), t(31) = 0.29, p = .774. Participants in the sad condition felt as sad as in the worried 
condition (4.83; 5.47), t(25) = 0.04, p = .968, and as worried (3.33; 3.67), t(25) = .42, p = 






.677. Thus, at the level of specific emotions, the manipulation was less successful than at 
the level of positive compared to negative emotions according to self-reported feelings.  
Hypothesis Test 
We computed the number of trials that participants took to learn a rule/reversal as 
a dependent measure. For those subjects who did not reach a reversal within 50 trials and 
thus had no value for the reversal, missing data were replaced by the sample mean plus 
two standard deviations (a score of 49)3. The number of trials for rule/reversal learning 
was averaged across the three repetitions, so that each subject had one score for each rule, 
first reversal, and second reversal learning ranging from 10 (good performance) to 50 
(poor performance).  
A mixed analysis of variance with rule/reversal mean number of trials as a within 
factor and condition as a between factor showed a significant main effect of 
rule/reversals, F(2, 144) = 83.64, p < .001. Rules were initially learned faster (22.40) than 
first and second reversals (31.55; 31.64), t(76) = 9.55, p < .001 and t(76) = 9.44, p < .001; 
see Figure 3.1. A main effect of emotion condition, F(4, 72) = 3.35, p = .014, was 
qualified by an interaction of condition with rule/reversal learning,  F(8, 144) = 2.21, p = 
.038. In the happy condition, participants learned rules about as fast as the control 
participants (26.56; 20.83), t(30) = 1.52, p = .140, but took longer to learn first reversals 
(37.88; 28.81), t(30) = 2.01, p = .054, and second reversals (38.25; 28.79), t(30) = 2.19, p 
= .037. The other emotion conditions did not differ from the control for rule or reversal 
learning, all ps > .05. Compared to relieved participants (18.82; 23.45; 24.14), happy 
participants took longer to learn rules, t(31) = 2.43, p = .021, first reversals, t(31) = 3.43, 
p = .002, and second reversals, t(31) = 3.28, p = .003.   






To examine whether poorer performance in the happy condition was due to faster 
reaction times, we ran a mixed measures analysis of reaction times in rule/reversal 
learning as the within factor and emotion condition as the between factor. This analysis 
showed a main effect of rule/reversal learning, F(2, 80) = 23.04, p < .001, and no other 
effect. Reaction times were longer for rule learning than first and second reversal 
learning, (694; 593; 594), t(54) = 5.13, p < . 001, t(44) = 4.89, p < .001. Including the 
average reaction time as a covariate in the main analysis did not change the results for the 
interaction between emotion conditions and rule/reversal learning, F(8, 142) = 2.13, p = 
.037. 
Post-hoc Analysis of Essays 
 The essays were content coded to verify condition assignment. One rater coded all 
essays and one rater coded 66 essays, both blind to condition. They achieved an 
acceptable level of rater agreement (Cohen’s kappa = .75; in case of disagreements, the 
codes of the rater who rated all essays were used). In the happy, sad, and control 
condition, essay codes reflected condition assignment for all but one, one, and two 
participants, respectively. However, in the relieved and worried condition, the essays of 
five and six participants, respectively, could not be identified by the coders. When 
selecting only those participants whose essays reflected their condition assignment, the 
pattern of the results remained the same. Happy participants did not differ from control 
participants for rule learning (27.56; 22.14), t(27) = 1.38, p = .118, but took longer to 
learn first reversals (39.29; 30.55), t(27) = 1.92, p = .066, and second reversals (39.69; 
30.29), t(27) = 1.25, p = .041. The other emotion conditions did not differ from the 
control for rule or reversal learning, all ps > .05. Also, happy participants took longer to 






learn rules and reversals than relieved participants (20; 24.75; 27.11), t(25) = 2.06, p = 
.05; t(25) = 3.00, p = .006; t(25) = 2.63, p = .015. 
Discussion 
A Reversal Learning Task was used to study the effect of different positive and 
negative emotions on cognitive flexibility. We found that happiness impaired reversal 
learning but relief did not impair reversal learning. The effect cannot be attributed to 
faster reaction times in the happy condition. A limitation of our study is that the 
manipulation checks did not differentiate between positive (negative) emotions. 
However, the analysis of the essays suggests that condition assignment was generally 
successful. Given the significant effects on performance, it is possible that the 
manipulation checks were insensitive to the differences between positive emotions. 
Future research should differentiate between these emotions more clearly.  
As happiness differed from another positive emotion (relief), the influence of 
happiness cannot be attributed to positive valence. Also, the activation level associated 
with the emotions does not seem useful to explain the findings, since happiness and 
worry differed in their effect. Similarly, happiness and sadness differed in the influence 
on reversal learning, suggesting that differences in approach/avoidance orientation did 
not explain the effect.  
However, the underlying appraisals of happiness, relief, sadness, and worry may 
be important for reversal learning. Appraisals associated with an emotion may signal 
which behavior is most required (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
Happiness differs from the other three emotion conditions on several appraisals. For 
example, control might play a role for performance. Specifically, good performance in 






the reversal learning task might be a function of increased attempts to regain control, 
after an event where one lacked control and autonomy signals the need to reestablish 
control. When feeling happy, however, the individual is already provided with a sense of 
control, and there is no need to establish control. However, if perceptions of control drive 
the influence of emotions on reversal learning, sadness, worry, and relief should improve 
performance compared to the control condition. This was not the case in the present 
study. However, stronger mood manipulations might have resulted in a difference of a 
control compared to a relief, worry, and sadness condition. Thus, further research is 
required to rule out the importance of control appraisals. Alternatively to control, the 
belief in a good and fair world might drive the effect. This belief goes beyond perceiving 
that a situation is not problematic. It entails the idea that things are not only fine, but at 
their best. As a result, perceptions that the world is good and fair do not require an 
individual to understand the logic of changes in reward-contingencies, and may not 
induce attempts to increase predictability. A belief in a good world should be more 
prominent with happiness than relief, worry, sadness, or a control. Future research should 
examine the importance of control appraisals and beliefs in a good world for performance 
in reversal learning. 
The prediction from the Mood Behavior Model that incidental emotions affect 
performance when performance feedback is given was not supported. Similarly, the 
predictions from Capacity Theories that emotions impair performance were not 
supported. According to the Dopaminergic Model, happiness and relief should improve 
cognitive flexibility. However, we found that positive emotions differ in how they 






influence reversal learning: Happiness impaired flexibility, and relief showed a tendency 
to improve it. 
The results are in line, however, with a Differentiated Dopaminergic Model. 
According to this model, positive emotions have differential effects on different types of 
cognitive flexibility. We found that happiness is particularly hurtful for reversal learning. 
However, past research has shown that happiness improves flexibility in the creativity 
domain (De Dreu et al., 2008). Thus, our study indicates that happiness can have 
facilitating or impairing effects on different types of flexibility.  
We suggest that flexibility in creativity and in reversal learning belong to different 
types of flexibility. We distinguish between associative and regulative flexibility and 
suggest that emotions influence these two types of flexibility in opposing ways. Also, we 
propose a taxonomy of related tasks. Associative flexibility involves breaking a set of 
typical associations and creating new associations. Associative flexibility is characterized 
by originality and an affinity to the new and unusual. It is based on associative networks 
that are activated unconsciously and effortlessly. Tasks measuring primarily associative 
flexibility are remote associates tasks (e.g., Mednick & Mednick, 1967), insight problem 
solving tasks (e.g., Duncker, 1945), categorization tasks (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), 
and idea generation tasks (e.g., Torrance, 1974). In remote association tasks, unusual 
connections result in finding a concept common to given stimuli. In insight problem 
solving tasks, making associations between objects and unusual uses facilitates finding a 
solution. In categorization tasks, perceived connections between objects and concepts 
result in more inclusive categories. Similarly, in brainstorming or fluency tasks, solutions 
are seen as belonging to the pool of answers based on unusual associations.  






Regulative flexibility is an executive function relevant to changing rules. It refers 
to the ability to adjust to different stimulus-reward associations (reward-based control; 
Rogers et al., 1999). Examples of reward-based tasks are the Reversal Learning Task 
(e.g., Clark, Cools, & Robins, 2004; Waltz & Gold, 2007) and the Regime Change Task 
(Massey & Wu, 2005). Having high regulative flexibility does not result in being original 
and creative, but in being able to adjust to lasting changes in the environment. The ability 
to identify new rules, to inhibit perseverance of old rules, and to maintain new rules are 
characteristics of regulative flexibility. Performance on executive tasks is effortful and 
decreases when cognitive load is increased (e.g., Phillips, 1997). The specific task 
requirements and the degree of task difficulty are fruitful avenues for future research on 
the influence of emotions on cognitive flexibility.  
An explicit taxonomy of tasks complements the distinction between associative 
and regulative flexibility that has similarly been suggested by others (Phillips et al., 
2002). Our goal is to integrate the existing research on flexibility types (Phillips et al., 
2002) with research distinguishing among positive and negative emotions. Existing 
research has shown that valence, activation level, and regulatory focus of an emotion are 
relevant predictors for associative flexibility (e.g., Baas et al., 2008), but has not yet 
addressed other types of flexibility. Research on the appraisals associated with emotions 
has examined outcome variables such as social judgments, but not flexibility (e.g., Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000). Future research is needed to test the prediction that regulative and 
associative flexibility are differently affected by different positive and negative emotions.  
Future research could also connect research on the influence of emotions on 
reversal learning with research on the influence of emotions on other behaviors, such as 






gambling behavior. Cognitive flexibility in reversal learning refers to the ability to learn 
changes in reward situations. It is related to decision making concerning risks, e.g. in 
gambling decisions (Clark, Cools, & Robins, 2004). Previous research shows that in early 
stages of the Iowa Gambling Task, positive affect improves performance (Vries, Holland, 
& Witteman, 2008). This is consistent with research showing that happiness heightens the 
sensitivity for losses, and results in reduced risk taking (e.g., Isen, Nygren, & Ashby, 
1988). However, increased levels of dopamine in medicated Parkinson’s patients increase 
pathological gambling (Voon & Fox, 2007). How can the notion that happiness improves 
gambling performance but impairs reversal learning be reconciled? We suggest that 
happiness might lead to improved gambling behavior when risk aversion is beneficial, 
but not when successful performance requires recognizing changes in reward 
contingencies. Understanding the factors that influence risk taking has both theoretical 
interest and applied relevance. For example, risk taking in gambling decisions is 
associated with increased drug abuse (e.g., Passetti, Clark, Mehta, Joyce, & King, 2008). 
Therefore, understanding the influence of emotions on flexibility in different domains has 
important applications.  
Our study provides evidence that happiness, an emotion that typically increases 
associative flexibility, decreases regulative flexibility in a reversal learning task. The  
Dopaminergic Model, Capacity Theories, and the Mood Behavior Model cannot account 
for this finding. However, the findings support a Differentiated Dopaminergic Model 
where different emotions and types of flexibility are taken into account. The model 
suggests that emotions can have antagonistic effects on tasks that belong to the regulative 
flexibility category, such as the reversal learning task, or to the associative flexibility 






category, such as many creativity tasks. The integration of research identifying types of 
flexibility (Phillips et al., 2002), features of emotions (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2008; Tong, 
2008), and underlying neural mechanisms (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999; Rogers et al., 1999) is 
a fruitful avenue for future research. We hope that the suggested taxonomy of tasks will 
help inspire and guide this process. 







 1Thirteen participants were suspicious about the purpose of the study and four 
female participants did not understand the task even after practice trials as indicated by 
never achieving successful reversal learning; these participants were excluded from the 
analysis. Including these participants in the analysis did not change the significant 
interaction of emotion condition and rule/reversal learning, but only the mean 
comparisons of happy versus relieved for learning reversals remained significant. 
 2One participant did not complete the manipulation check items. 
3This score was given to 25.5% of all reversals across participants and at least 
once to 51% of participants. In a repeated measures analysis without accounting for 
missing data, the interaction between emotion condition and rule/reversal learning was 
not significant due to lack of power. However, individual comparisons (happy versus 
control, happy versus relieved) still resulted in significant mean differences.  






Table 3.1 Predictions by different models for reversal learning performance impairment 
() or improvement () under positive and negative emotions 
  Model 
0 0 Mood Behavior Model (Gendolla, 2000) 
  Capacity Theories (Mackie & Worth, 1989) 
  Dopaminergic Model (Ashby et al., 1999) 
H  Differentiated Dopaminergic Model 
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Chapter 4 
The Influence of Happiness and Relief on Different Types of Cognitive Flexibility 
 
 What is common to brain-storming ideas for a wedding gift, alternating checking 
your email with reading the news, and adapting to the fact that your teenage children give 
you dirty looks when you want to spend time with them after all the years of craving 
constant care and attention from you? All these behaviors require cognitive flexibility. 
Like other cognitive tendencies, cognitive flexibility is influenced by emotions (e.g., Isen, 
1990).  
Previous research has shown that positive affect aroused in one situation improves 
flexibility on a variety of tasks (Isen and colleagues). In fact, some believe that it “is now 
well recognized that positive affect leads to greater cognitive flexibility” (Ashby, Isen,  
Turken, 1999, p. 530). However, flexibility is not a unitary concept (e.g., Frick, Guilford, 
Christensen, &Merrifield, 1959), and whether positive affect improves flexibility may 
depend on the type of flexibility (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009). Also, positive emotions 
may differ in their influence on cognitive tendencies (e.g., De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 
2008). In the current paper, we suggest that not all positive and negative emotions 
influence all types of flexibility in the same way. We propose a distinction between 
different types of flexibility, and test the idea that they are differentially influenced by 
different positive emotions (study 1). We also attempt to identify mediators in the relation
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between emotions and cognitive flexibility (study 2). 
Because the emotions are aroused prior to the performance situation and are not 
an integral part of it, they are called incidental emotions (as opposed to integral emotions; 
Bodenhausen, 1993). Emotions can be defined as a syndrome of a subjective feeling (e.g., 
pleasant, aroused), a judgment about the situation (e.g., you are responsible), behavioral 
tendencies that encompass cognition (e.g., global versus local; flexible versus inflexible) 
and action (e.g., approaching versus avoiding), physiological changes (e.g., heart rate), 
and sometimes an emotion label (e.g., happy). As briefly reviewed in the following 
section, research on the influence of emotions on cognitive flexibility in some domains 
(e.g., creativity) is well established, and several theories exist to explain the effect of 
emotions. 
Previous Research on Emotions and Flexibility 
Positive affect improves performance on a variety of tasks involving creativity. 
For example, individuals in a happy mood categorize more inclusively (Isen & Daubman, 
1984), generate more ideas in brain-storming tasks (Isen, Labroo, & Durlach, 2004), and 
solve remote associate problems better (Isen et al., 2004). Recent meta-analyses (Baas, 
De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009) confirm that happiness generally improves 
creativity in these types of tasks. Several models have been proposed to explain why 
emotions influence cognitive tendencies (e.g., Broaden and Build Theory, Fredrickson, 
1998; Mood as Information Model, Schwarz & Clore, 1983). According to the 
Dopaminergic Model (Ashby et al., 1999), the influence of positive emotions on 
cognitive tendencies is a function of increased levels of dopamine. However, for several 
reasons, a further specification of this model may be necessary. 
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Although the Dopaminergic Model assumes that dopamine improves all types of 
flexibility, there is some indication that dopamine does not always facilitate flexibility. 
For example, in Parkinson’s patients, medication-induced increases of dopamine reduce 
flexibility in rule learning (Cools, Lewis, Clark, Barker, & Robbins, 2007). Recent 
research shows that “dopamine and dopamine receptor agonists have contrasting effects 
on the expression of function depending on, among other factors, the brain region that is 
implicated by the process under study, the baseline levels of dopamine in that brain 
region and receptor specificity” (Cools, 2008, p. 383).  
An additional challenge for existing theories on the relation between positive 
emotions and flexibility is that they do not account for instances where positive affect 
impairs flexibility. For example, positive affect increases response times in a switching 
Stroop task (Phillips, Bull, Adams, & Fraser, 2002). Also, happiness impairs flexibility in 
reversal learning (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009). Thus, positive affect is beneficial for 
certain types of flexibility but not for others. Specifically, flexibility in the creativity 
domain could be different from controlled switching processes (Phillips et al., 2002). 
Even flexibility in executive functions can refer to different types of control, such as 
reward-based or attention-based (Rogers et al., 1999, Slamecka, 1968). Thus, a 
differentiation of the Dopaminergic Model regarding different types of flexibility seems 
necessary.  
A further specification of the Dopaminergic Model concerns the category 
‘positive affect’ because emotions of the same valence may influence the same type of 
flexibility differently. For example, flexibility in the creativity domain is influenced 
differently by different positive emotions. Specifically, in a recent meta-analysis positive 
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emotions classified as activating (e.g., happiness) increased idea generation, but emotions 
classified as de-activating (e.g., relaxedness) did not (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008). 
Also, flexibility in learning changes in reward contingencies is differentially influenced 
by positive emotions. Here, the pattern of results for happiness was opposite to the 
findings for flexibility in the creativity domain. Specifically, happiness impaired 
performance in reversal learning, but relief did not (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009).  
These different outcomes of happiness could be explained by the appraisals 
underlying different positive emotions. For example, happiness is typically associated 
with pleasantness, certainty, and perceived control (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), and 
can additionally be characterized by a belief that the world is good and fair, high self-
regard, social appropriateness, and change (Tong, 2008). Relief may be characterized by 
ascribing agency to circumstances, perceiving little autonomy, and being less certain than 
with happiness (Tong, 2008). Also, the perceived pleasantness of a situation changes 
from negative to positive. Thus, happiness is relatively higher in perceived control, 
certainty, and beliefs in a good and fair world than relief. These differences may be 
important for subsequent cognitive flexibility. For example, perceptions of control may 
provide a safe base for exploring unusual ideas and thereby increase flexibility in creative 
tasks (Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). However, perceiving little control 
might induce behaviors to regain control, such as carefully monitoring reward-
contingencies. On the other hand, when feeling happy, individuals may already be 
provided with a sense of control and feel no need to establish control, thereby reducing 
performance in tasks that require monitoring changes in reward contingencies, such as 
reversal learning. 
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Although a large body of research suggests that positive affect facilitates 
flexibility, it seems necessary to consider more precisely which positive emotions might 
improve or impair which types of cognitive flexibility. We propose a differentiation of 
the Dopaminergic Model that takes into account different positive emotions as well as 
different types of flexibility. In the next section, we differentiate between associative, 
regulative, and attentional flexibility.  
Types of Flexibility 
We propose a distinction between associative, regulative, and attentional 
flexibility, and suggest that emotions influence these types of flexibility in different ways. 
Distinguishing among different types of flexibility is not a new idea. In 1959, Frick et al. 
published a factor analytic study of flexibility and a related taxonomy of tasks. They 
distinguished between “spontaneous” and “adaptive” flexibility. They defined 
spontaneous flexibility as “the ability to produce a diversity of ideas in a relatively 
unstructured situation,” and adaptive flexibility as “the ability to change set in order to 
meet requirements imposed by changing problems” (p. 471). Similarly, Phillips et al. 
(2002) differentiate spontaneous from controlled flexibility. Furthermore, reward-based 
and attention-based control processes seem to differ (Rogers et al., 1999; Ravizza & 
Carter, 2008). Reward-based control refers to “learning revised stimulus-reward 
linkages” and attention-based control to “the reallocation of attention towards newly-
relevant features of environment stimuli” (Rogers et al., 1999, p. 488). Therefore, we 
differentiate three types of flexibility: associative flexibility (“spontaneous”), regulative 
flexibility (controlled, reward-based), and attentional flexibility (controlled, attention-
based, “adaptive”). 
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Associative flexibility involves breaking a set of typical associations and creating 
new associations. Associative flexibility is characterized by an affinity to the new and 
unusual, as well as inclusiveness. Novel ideas are perceived as part of the universe of 
possible solutions to a problem. It is based on associative networks that are activated 
unconsciously and effortlessly.  
With regulative and attentional flexibility, the changes are not created by the 
individual, but imposed by the environment. Regulative flexibility refers to the ability to 
adjust to different stimulus-reward associations (reward-based control; Rogers et al., 
1999). For example, in social interactions, the mood of others might change. Regulative 
flexibility is necessary to learn when the mood of a person changes, and when somebody 
who used to be happy is now in a negative mood, and vice versa (e.g., Kringelbach & 
Rolls, 2003).  For regulative flexibility, the ability to identify new reward-contingencies 
and inhibit perseverance of old contingencies is crucial. This is what defines the 
flexibility. Additionally, regulative flexibility is characterized by the ability to maintain 
new contingencies (in contrast to a mere affinity to things new). Regulative flexibility is 
associated with activity in the ventral striatum and orbiofrontal cortex (Cools, Barker, 
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001). 
Attentional flexibility refers to the ability to switch attention between different 
types of stimulus features or stimuli (attentional control; extra-dimensional set-shifting; 
Rogers et al., 1999). For example, books in a shelf can be arranged according to publisher 
or according to color. When cleaning a room one could pay attention to the clothes that 
need to be folded or to the papers scattered on the floor. Attentional flexibility is 
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associated with the dorsal striatum and the dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (Cools et al., 
2003). 
Regulative flexibility and attentional flexibility are executive functions. Executive 
processes are involved in conscious, effortful control and regulation of cognition and 
behavior (Phillips, 1997). As a result, performance on executive tasks decreases when 
cognitive load is increased (e.g., in a dual-task paradigm; Phillips, 1997). However, 
regulation strategies that are initially effortful can become automatic, and are then no 
longer considered an executive process (Phillips, 1997; Rabbitt, 1997). Like other 
executive functions, such as working memory, continuous inhibitions, and planning, 
regulative and attentional flexibility are likely to be correlated with the broader concept 
of fluid intelligence (Rabbitt, 1997). 
Although associative flexibility is prevalent in creativity, and regulative and 
attentional flexibility are prevalent in executive functions, we refrain from calling the 
flexibility types “creative” flexibility and “executive function” flexibility. Creativity can 
also be achieved by other means, such as persistence (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2008), and 
acknowledging something as ‘creative’ depends on the environment (e.g., Sternberg, 
2006). In fact, past research shows that positive affect does not facilitate performance on 
some types of creativity tasks (e.g., Akinola & Mendes, 2008). Also, response latencies 
in insight problem solving can be impaired under positive affect (Kaufmann & Vosburg, 
1997). Similarly, executive function refers to several abilities that are influenced by 
emotions, such as planning. For example, positive affect impairs performance on the 
Tower of London task (Oaksford, Morris, Grainger, & Williams, 1996). However, 
planning involves primarily working memory (Oaksford et al., 1996) rather than 
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flexibility. Instead of differentiating creative behavior and executive functions more 
broadly, the purpose of the present framework is to differentiate between different types 
of flexibility which may or may not play a role in creativity and in different executive 
functions. 
Assessment of Associative, Regulative, and Attentional Flexibility 
An explicit taxonomy of tasks (Table 4.1) complements the distinctions between 
associative, regulative, and attentional flexibility that have been suggested by others 
(Phillips et al., 2002; Rogers et al., 1999; Slamecka, 1968). Tasks primarily measuring 
associative flexibility are insight problem solving tasks (e.g., Duncker, 1945), 
categorization tasks (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), idea generation tasks (e.g., Torrance, 
1974), and remote associates tests (e.g., Mednick & Mednick, 1967). In insight problem 
solving tasks, making associations between objects and unusual uses facilitates finding a 
solution. In categorization tasks, perceived connections between objects and concepts 
result in more inclusive categories. Idea generation and remote associates tasks are used 
in the current study, and thus deserve more detailed introduction. 
In idea generation, brainstorming, or fluency tasks, participants are asked to 
generate a lists of solutions to a certain problem, such as a list of things that can fly (e.g., 
Gasper, 2004), uses of a brick (e.g., Davis, Kirby, & Curtis, 2007; Guilford, 1960), or 
words starting with a certain letter of the alphabet (e.g., Isen et al., 2004).  A formal 
version of the task is The Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974), which 
provides standardized instructions for this type of task, as well as normative data. 
Responses to idea generation tasks can be analyzed for quantity (fluency), unusualness of 
responses (originality), amount of detail in responses (elaboration), and number of 
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different categories of answers (flexibility; Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1974). Fluency in 
idea generation tasks is not a pure measure of associative flexibility, because individuals 
can use systematic strategies to perform well in fluency tasks (Phillips, 1997); however 
the degree to which individuals use associations versus strategies can be assessed by 
measuring the flexibility and originality of answers in this type of task. Past research 
shows that happiness increases fluency, category flexibility, and originality (e.g., Murray, 
Sujan, Hirt, & Sujan, 1990). In line with the Dopaminergic Model (Ashby et al., 1999), 
Parkinson’s patients with depleted dopamine (off medication) show reduced performance 
on fluency tasks (Gotham, Brown, & Marsden, 1988). 
The remote associates test was developed by Mednick (1962) to measure creative 
thinking. In this task, participants see three stimulus words and have to create a solution 
that meaningfully relates to all stimuli. In some remote associates tests, the way the 
solution relates to the stimulus words differs; e.g., in the triad “same-tennis-head,” the 
solution “match” relates to one word as a synonym (same-match), builds a compound 
word with another word (match head), and is a semantic association with the third word 
(tennis match; Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) 
created remote associate items where solutions build compound words with each stimulus 
word, and describe normative data for the difficulty of items under different time 
constraints. In remote associates tests, unusual connections between concepts result in 
finding a solution. Performance on remote associates tests is improved with happiness 
(e.g., Isen et al., 2004). Both idea generation and remote associates tasks belong in the 
category of associative flexibility.  
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Another type of flexibility, regulative flexibility can be assessed with reversal 
learning tasks (e.g., Clark, Cools, & Robins, 2004; Waltz & Gold, 2007) and the Regime 
Change Task (Massey & Wu, 2005). A reversal learning task is used in the current study, 
and is described below in more detail.  
In a reversal learning paradigm (e.g., Rolls, 2004), participants are asked to select 
one of two stimuli and learn through feedback whether the stimulus is ‘correct.’ First, 
participants learn the rule that one stimulus has a higher chance of being correct. 
However, the stimulus that is reinforced changes throughout the task. Flexibility is 
required to learn these rule reversals. The ability to learn reversals is important for 
adapting to changes in rewards regarding basic behaviors, such as the acquisition of tasty 
foods, as well as social situations (e.g., Kringelbach & Rolls, 2003). Previous research 
shows that happiness, but not relief, impairs performance on reversal learning (Sacharin 
& Gonzalez, 2009). In line with a differentiated Dopaminergic Model, Parkinson’s 
patients with higher levels of dopamine (on medication) show reduced performance on 
this task (Cools et al., 2007). 
 Examples of attentional flexibility tasks are the Wisconsin Card-Sort Task (Berg, 
1948; Heaton, 1981), the Implicit Association Task (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998), Task Switching Tasks (e.g., Monsell, 2003), and the California Card Sorting Test 
(CCST; Delis, Squire, Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). For the Wisconsin Card-Sort Task and 
the CCST, individuals have to figure out what they need to attend to themselves. In the 
Implicit Association Task (Greenwald et al., 1998) and Task Switching Tasks (e.g., 
Monsell, 2003), the relevant feature that requires attention is indicated by the task. A 
CCST is used in this study and will be described in more detail.  
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The CCST consists of three stimulus sets with six stimuli. For each set, three sub-
tasks are administered. In the Free Sorting sub-task, participants are asked to sort the 
items repeatedly into two equal piles and state a sorting rule for each pile. Items can be 
sorted according to three verbal criteria (e.g., land versus water animals), or according to 
three non-verbal criteria (e.g., black versus white triangle). This sub-task measures the 
ability to generate sorts, verbalize sorting principles, and inhibit perseverative sorts and 
descriptions. In the Structured Sorting sub-task, participants are presented with different 
sorts, and are asked to identify the sorting rule for each pile. This sub-task measures the 
ability to verbalize sorting principles and inhibit perseverance in sorting descriptions. In 
the Cued Sorting sub-task, participants are asked to sort the items according to cues given 
by the experimenter. This sub-task measures the ability to comprehend sorting rules. The 
procedure repeats with each stimulus set.  
 The task appears similar to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton, 1981). 
However, psychometric analyses show that it does not measure the very same abilities 
(Greve, Farrell, Besson, & Crouch, 1995). Also, the CCST allows for more refined 
analyses (Delis et al., 1992). For example, verbal and nonverbal concept formation can be 
differentiated in the CCST. Also, the task allows differentiating between deficits in 
knowing sorting rules and enacting sorting rules. Furthermore, the CCST does not 
provide performance feedback, and is thus potentially less aversive for respondents, 
compared to the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test and the reversal learning task.  
To our knowledge, there are no data on the influence of emotions on performance 
on the CCST. On the one hand, some evidence suggests that positive affect might 
increase performance. For example, children switch sorting criteria (e.g., sort faces by 
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gender or by age) more easily when happy face stimuli are used than sad face stimuli (Qu 
& Zelazo, 2007). The paradigm used in this study is similar to the Cued Sorting sub-task 
of the CCST. However, the results could be due to the fact that sad faces capture attention 
more than happy faces, and reduce the ability to perform additional cognitive tasks 
(Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003). Research on medicated Parkinson’s patients is 
mixed. On the one hand, Parkinson’s patients show impairments in set-shifting (Cools et 
al., 2001; Downes et al., 1989). On the other hand, dopamine medication does not seem 
to change performance (Lewis, Slabosz, Robbins, Barker, & Owen., 2005), suggesting 
that decreased performance by patient groups is not due to changes in dopamine levels. 
Finally, switching between different sorting criteria (e.g., color of word versus word 
meaning) in a Stroop task is impaired with happiness (Phillips et al., 2002). Thus, the 
existing evidence for the influence of emotions on attentional flexibility is inconclusive.  
Study 1 
The goal of this paper is to integrate the existing research on flexibility types 
(Swainson et al., 2000; Phillips et al., 2002) with research distinguishing among emotions 
of the same valence (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2008; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). We aim to test 
the prediction that associative, regulative, and attentional flexibility are differently 
affected by different positive emotions, specifically happiness and relief.  
There exists evidence for differential outcomes of different emotions on different 
types of flexibility. Past research shows that the influence of different positive and 
negative emotions varies for tasks from the associative flexibility category (e.g., Baas et 
al., 2008). Also, happiness and relief influence regulative flexibility in reversal learning 
differently (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009). However, to our knowledge no study has 
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compared the influence of emotions on regulative and associative flexibility. The 
simultaneous assessment of both types of flexibility is necessary to rule out confounding 
effects. For example, it is possible that the happiness condition used in previous research 
on reversal learning (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009) differed from that used in research on 
associative flexibility tasks in a systematic way, and therefore resulted in reduced 
performance on subsequent tasks, regardless of whether they were associative or 
regulative flexibility tasks. To compare performance on associative and regulative 
flexibility directly, both types of flexibility need to be assessed in the same study.  
The additional benefit of a within-subjects design with associative and regulative 
flexibility is that it can provide more specific insights. For example, does happiness 
improve associative flexibility and reduce regulative flexibility merely at a group level, 
or do individuals show negative correlations between those types of flexibility? The 
relation between variables need not necessarily reflect group differences in these 
variables (see Figure 4.1). For example, in dyads, trust and satisfaction might be 
positively related, because couples where trust is high are also more satisfied. However, 
on the individual level, trust and satisfaction might not be high if an individual’s trust is 
not reciprocated (Gonzalez & Griffin, 2001). More generally, differences between groups 
on two continuous variables, A and B, do not provide information on the relation between 
variables A and B in individuals. Intuitively, if group H (happiness) is high on variable A 
(e.g., associative flexibility) and low on variable B (e.g., regulative flexibility), and group 
C (control) is low on variable A and high on variable B, one expects a negative relation 
between A and B corresponding to line 1 in figure 4.1. Generalizing from the group level 
of analysis to the individual level is called the “ecological correlation fallacy” (Robinson, 
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1950). Although a correspondence between levels of analysis is the easiest relation to 
comprehend, it is not the only way A and B could be related. For example, in Figure 4.1, 
the variables A and B might show a negative (1) or positive (2) linear relation, or no 
linear relation (3), regardless of group differences between group H and C. Discussions 
of empirical cases where group differences are not reflected in individual differences are 
provided by Robinson (1950). It is therefore an empirical question whether variables are 
related in individuals in a way similar to group differences.  
Another advantage of the simultaneous assessment of different types of flexibility 
is that it is possible to examine whether the effects of emotions are stronger for one type 
of flexibility than for the other. According to the Mood Behavior Model (Gendolla, 
2000), incidental mood can be used as information that influences associations and 
cognitive processing. The model emphasizes that mood is but one piece of information 
about a situation. Information given by the task itself, for example, about how difficult it 
is or via direct performance feedback, can reduce the effect of incidental mood as 
information. Given that executive function tasks are inherently effortful (Phillips, 1997), 
the informational value of emotions might be relatively higher for associative flexibility 
tasks than for regulative and attentional flexibility tasks resulting in a smaller influence of 
emotions on the latter two.  
Hypotheses 
In the current study, we simultaneously compare the influence of happiness, 
relief, and a control condition on associative, regulative, and attentional flexibility. 
Associative flexibility is assessed with an idea generation and a remote associates task, 
regulative flexibility with a reversal learning task, and attentional flexibility with a 
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CCST. Based on the literature review, we expect that happiness will increase 
performance for idea generation and remote associates, and decrease performance for 
reversal learning. For relief, we expect no difference relative to the control condition 
based on previous research on reversal learning (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009). The 
influence of emotions on performance on the CCST will be explored. The influence on 
attentional flexibility will be explored, because previous research and theory do not 
provide sufficient ground to derive a hypothesis (see Table 4.2). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-two women (mean age 19) participated in the study for partial course credit. 
They were largely Caucasian (73%), with a minority of Asians/Asian-Americans (15%), 
African-Americans (5%), Latinas (5%), and others (3%). From an originally larger 
sample of eighty-three, eight suspicious participants were excluded, as well as thirteen 
participants who did not perform one of the four tasks due to computer errors and several 
fire alarms, or because the study went over the allotted time and had to be discontinued 
prematurely.1  
Procedure 
Participants were told that we were conducting two studies: One on the effect of 
length of essay writing on feelings, and a second on the relation between various 
cognitive tasks. After signing a fake consent form for each study, participants were 
randomly assigned to a happy, relieved, or control condition. After participants provided 
two events where they felt happy, relieved, or selected two weekdays (Monday – 
Thursday), we asked participants to write about the first event (weekday) for 9 minutes. 
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After a manipulation check where participants indicated their current feelings, the first 
block of cognitive tasks was administered. Then, we induced moods again by asking, 
participants to write a longer essay about the second event (weekday) for 9 minutes, 
followed by a second manipulation check, and a second block of cognitive tasks. In one 
cognitive task block, regulative flexibility was assessed with a reversal learning task that 
measures reward-based control. In the other block, attentional control was assessed with a 
CCST (Delis et al., 1992), and associative flexibility was assessed with a remote 
associates test (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003), and an idea generation task. The order 
of these tasks was counter-balanced. The order of the blocks was also counterbalanced. 
Participants provided demographic information before they were probed for suspicion, 
debriefed, and asked to sign the consent form for the entire study. The duration of the 
study was about one hour. 
Measures 
Emotion arousal. We employed the method of life event essays to induce 
emotion.  The instructions for the happy condition read “Remember a recent event in 
your life that made you feel HAPPY and POSITIVE. Visualize the event in your mind, 
imagine the event vividly. Try to re-experience the original perceptions, sensations, and 
affective reactions. Write down the imagined event and elaborate on your thoughts and 
feelings.” In the relieved condition, ‘happy’ was replaced with ‘relieved.’ Control 
condition participants were asked to write about a regular week-day. 
Mood assessment. After the emotion arousal and again at the end of the study, 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt, at this moment, on five 9-point items 
anchored with “very bad - very good,” “very unhappy – very happy,” “not at all relieved 
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– very relieved,” “very calm – very active,” and “very certain / not confused – very 
uncertain / confused.” 
Idea generation task. Participants were asked to generate as many different ideas 
as possible for uses of a brick. They had a total of five minutes to generate ideas. In 
addition to recording participants’ responses, we also recorded response times to compute 
the number of ideas within the first minute, the first two minutes, and five minutes. Ideas 
were counted (so-called fluency), and coded for number of different categories used 
(category flexibility), and unusualness of ideas (originality).  
While computing the fluency score is relatively straightforward, determining the 
category flexibility and the originality score requires some explanation. Two coders blind 
to emotion condition coded for 18 content categories, plus one category of inadequate 
responses (see Table 4.3 for examples). Coder agreement was good with Cohen’s kappa 
= .88. Disagreements were resolved through discussion. Category flexibility was 
determined by the sum of different categories used (regardless of the number of ideas 
within each category). Unusualness was based on the frequency of the answers within the 
sample. We identified categories that contained fewer than 1% of all ideas (Identifier, 
Gift, Heating, Study Material, Ground Brick, Hiding Place, Fix), and summed all ideas 
from these categories, as well as from the category “Other,” to build an unusualness 
score. Thus, more elaborate ideas that fell into a more common category (e.g., from the 
category Build, “To build a fort for a little kid”) were not included in this score. 
Remote associates test. We selected 30 items from Bowden and Jung-Beeman 
(2003). Based on the norms provided by these authors, two items were of low difficulty 
(66% - 80%) of participants reached a solution in 15 seconds), 27 items of moderate 
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difficulty (39 – 61 %), and one item of high difficulty (22%). Items were presented in 
random order. The program proceeded to the next stimulus item as soon as participants 
had typed their solution and hit ‘enter,’ or after 15 seconds passed. Before participants 
started the task, they were given instructions with two example items. We recorded 
participants’ solution words as well as their response time. The maximum score for 
correct solutions was 30. 
Reversal learning task. In the reversal learning task, participants saw two stimuli 
and selected the one that had a higher chance of being ‘correct.’ Unknown to participants, 
the probability of a stimulus being correct was 80%. Participants learned which stimulus 
was correct through feedback (rule learning). The stimulus that was correct changed 
twice (first and second reversal learning). Participants were told that the correct stimulus 
could change, but not how often or when. We used the E-prime script of Waltz and Gold 
(2007). Stimuli were grey-scale fractals. Participants needed to select the correct stimulus 
in 9 trials out of 10 (programmed in blocks of 5) before the pattern changed. If the 
participant did not reach this criterion, the pattern changed after the 50th trial. The 
program allowed up to 2 reversals. Participants repeated the task three times with 
different stimulus pairs.  
We computed the number of trials that participants took to learn a rule/reversal as 
a dependent measure. For those subjects who did not reach a reversal within 50 trials and 
thus had no value for the reversal, missing data was replaced by a score of 50 (the 
maximum score; the mean plus two standard deviations was used in previous research by 
Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009, but this value exceeded the maximum score in the current 
sample). Number of trials for rule/reversal learning was averaged across the three 
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repetitions, so that each subject had one score for each rule, first reversal, and second 
reversal learning ranging from 10 (good performance) to 50 (poor performance). To 
facilitate an analysis of reversal learning performance with performance on the other 
tasks used in this study, we subtracted the number of trials to learn rules from the average 
of the number of trials to learn reversals as a measure of reversal learning. Higher scores 
indicate poor performance. 
California Card Sorting Test. The CCST consists of three stimulus sets, but the 
correlation between a stimulus set and the overall CCST score has been judged 
sufficiently high to justify using one stimulus set as a short version of the task (Greve, 
Williams, & Crouch, 1995). Therefore, we used one of the three stimulus sets described 
by Delis et al. (1992). The verbal sorting criteria for the set are land versus water animals, 
large versus small animals, and pets versus man-eating animals. The non-verbal sorting 
criteria are black versus white triangle, triangle above versus below the word, and 
background lines slope left versus right.  
We developed a computerized version of the Free and the Structured Sorting sub-
tasks. The Cued Sorting sub-task was not used in this study due to time constraints. Also, 
Grewe, Farrell, et al., (1995) reported ceiling effects for this sub-task with college 
students, suggesting that it might be less valuable than the other sub-tasks with a college 
sample.  
To familiarize participants with the task, instructions with example sorts for a 
different stimulus set were given. Participants then had three minutes for the Free Sorting 
and 60 seconds for each trial of the Structured Sorting, similar to the time constraints in 
past research with college students (Greve, Williams, et al., 1995).  
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Results from the CCST yield several scores (compare Greve, Williams, et al., 
1995; Greve, Farrell, et al., 1995) for the sorts and descriptions. The following scores 
were applied in this study for sorts:  
1. Total Attempts is the total number of all attempted sorts (correct and 
incorrect sorts). 
2. Correct Sorts is the number of different sorts that corresponds to one of 
the six sorting rules (maximum score is 6), with a verbal (3 points) 
score and a non-verbal (3 points) score.  
3. Perseverative Sort is the number of correct, repeated sorts. 
4. Incorrect Sorts is the number of incorrect sorts (the sum of correct and 
incorrect sorts can be smaller than the number of all attempted sorts due 
to repetitions of answers). It consists of Nontarget and Unequal Sorts. 
a. Nontarget Sorts is the number of sorts with equal piles that do not 
correspond to a sorting rule. 
b. Unequal Sorts is the number of sorts with unequal piles.  
The following scores were applied for descriptions of sorting rules: 
1. Correct Descriptions are the number of different correct rule descriptions. 2 
points are given when each pile has an identifying rule (e.g., fish, mammals), 
and 1 point is given when pile descriptions refer to only one pile (e.g., fish, 
not fish). The maximum score is 12 points, and can be broken down into a 
verbal (6 points) and a nonverbal (6 points) score.  
2. Perseveration Descriptions is the total number of correct repeated 
descriptions.  
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3. Incorrect descriptions consist of Nonrule Descriptions and Nonmatch 
Descriptions. 
a. Nonrule Descriptions are descriptions that do not correspond to any 
sorting rule. 
b. Nonmatch Descriptions are descriptions that correspond to a sorting 
rule, but that do not apply to the current sort.  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Repeated measures ANOVA with mood at time 1 and at time 2 showed 
significant effects of emotion condition. For feeling good, the only significant effect was 
a main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 59) = 3.14, p = .05, with a marginal effect of 
time, F(1, 59) = 3.33, p = .07. At time 1, participants in the happy condition felt as good 
as control participants (7.08; 6.89), t(41) = 0.40, p = .69, and as relieved participants 
(7.08; 6.68), t(41) = 0.91, p = .37. At time 2, happy participants felt better than control 
participants (7.25; 6.11), t(41) = 3.18, p = .003, and than relieved participants (7.25; 
6.16), t(41) = 3.13, p = .003. Control and relieved participants reported similar levels of 
feeling good at both time points.  
For feeling happy, a similar pattern emerged. There was no main effect of 
emotion condition emerged, but a marginal effect of time, F(1, 59) = 3.55, p = .06, that 
was qualified by a marginally significant interaction with emotion condition, F(2, 59) = 
2.86, p = .07. At time 1, participants in the happy condition felt no more happy than 
control participants (7.00; 7.15), t(41) = 0.38, p = .71, or than relieved participants (7.00; 
6.63), t(41) = 0.90, p = .37. At time 2, participants in the happy condition felt happier 
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than control participants (7.17; 6.26), t(41) = 2.30, p = .027, and than relieved 
participants (7.17; 6.32), t(41) = 2.30, p = .027. Control and relieved participants reported 
similar levels of feeling happy at both time points. For feeling relieved, certain, or active, 
no effects emerged. Given the differential effects of mood on self reported feelings for 
different task blocks, we included block order as a variable in all following analyses. 
Idea Generation 
Three different measures were created from the idea generation task: Fluency as 
the number of ideas, flexibility as the number of different categories, and originality as 
the number of unusual ideas. To assess how fluency differed across emotion conditions, a 
repeated measures ANOVA with number of cumulative ideas generated at different time 
points (1, 2, or 5 min.) as a within factor, and emotion condition, block order (first or 
second block) and task order (first, second, or third within block) as between factors was 
conducted. More ideas were generated as time progressed, F(2, 90) = 119.96, p < .01. 
The only other significant effects were an interaction of block and task order, F(2, 45) = 
3.21, p = .050, and an interaction of emotion condition with task order, F(4, 45) = 2.60, p 
= .048, that was qualified by a three-way interaction of emotion condition, task order, and 
time for idea generation, F(8, 90) = 2.32, p = .026. To understand the three-way 
interaction, we conducted separate analyses by task order. Repeated measures analyses 
with time as a within factor and emotion condition and block order as between factors 
showed that emotion condition had an effect on idea generation only when the task was 
placed last, F(2, 16) = 4.31, p = .032. A main effect of block order emerged as well, F(1, 
16) = 5.78, p = .029, but no interaction of block order with emotion condition.  
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When the task was placed last, happy participants generated more ideas than 
relieved participants in one minute (6.50; 3.75), t(14) = 2.43, p = .029, two minutes 
(11.63; 5.50), t(14) = 2.49, p = .026, and five minutes (15.88; 9.25), t(14) = 2.17, p = .047 
(see Table 4.2). Scores of control participants lay in between and did not differ 
significantly from either emotion condition.  
To assess the influence of emotions on the number of different categories used by 
participants, we conducted an ANOVA with emotion condition, task order and block 
order as factors. A significant interaction of emotion condition and task order emerged, 
F(4, 45) = 3.59, p = .013. No other effects were significant. Follow-up analyses by task 
order showed that a significant effect emerged only when the idea generation task came 
last. A main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 16) = 9.12, p = .007, as well as a main 
effect of block order emerged, F(1, 16) = 9.78, p = .007.  
When the task was placed last, happy participants generated ideas from more 
different categories than control participants (8.25; 5.00), t(12) = 2.05, p = .063, and more 
than relieved participants (8.25; 4.38), t(14) = 3.22, p = .006. Other mean differences 
were not significant.  
Category flexibility was positively correlated with fluency (see Table 4.4). The 
effect of emotions on flexibility could thus be the result of increased fluency. When 
controlling for fluency by including fluency as a covariate in the model, the influence of 
emotions on flexible category use was still significant when the task came last, F(2, 15) = 
4.12, p = .037, despite a significant effect of fluency, F(1, 15) = 8.60, p = .01. Thus, 
category flexibility was not a function of fluency. 
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An ANOVA with emotion condition and task order and block order on originality 
showed a marginally significant interaction of emotion category and task order, F(4, 45) 
= 2.20, p = .085. Follow-up analyses by task order showed that emotions influenced 
originality only when the task came last, F(2, 16) = 5.24, p = .018. When the task came 
last, happy participants produced more unusual ideas than control participants (2.13; 
0.33), t(12) = 1.20, p = .073. Other mean differences were not significant.  
The unusualness of ideas was positively associated with fluency (see Table 4.4). 
The effect of emotions on originality was not significant when including fluency as a 
covariate in the model of emotion condition on unusual responses. Thus, the effect of 
emotions on originality was driven by fluency. 
Remote associates test 
An ANOVA with emotion condition, task order and block order as factors on the 
number of correctly solved remote associate items showed several effects: A main effect 
of task order, F(2, 44) = 4.65, p = .015, an interaction of emotion condition with task 
order, F(4, 33) = 4.25, p = .005, and an interaction of emotion condition with block order, 
F(2, 44) = 3.58, p = .036. Follow-up analyses by task order showed that there was a 
marginal effect of emotion condition on remote associates both when the task came first, 
F(2, 13) = 3.34, p = .068, and when the task came last, F(2, 20) = 3.29, p = .058. 
However, the direction of the effects was opposite (see Table 4.2): When the task came 
first, happy participants solved fewer remote associate items than control participants 
(7.86; 14.71), t(12) = 4.19, p = .001, but when the task came last, they produced more 
(15.27; 11.25), t(17) = 2.74, p = .014. When the task came last, relieved participants also 
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solved more items than control participants (14.00; 11.25), t(13) = 2.18, p = .049. Other 
mean differences were not significant. 
Reversal learning task 
An ANOVA with emotion condition and block order as factors showed a main 
effect of emotion condition, F(2, 56) = 3.09, p = .05, and no other effects. Participants in 
the happy condition took longer to learn reversals, relative to learning rules. The 
difference to the control condition was not significant, (11.28; 7.41), t(41) = 1.55, p = 
.129, but the difference to the relieved condition was significant (11.28; 5.22), t(41) = 
2.19, p = .034. Control and relieved condition participants did not differ significantly, 
t(41) = 0.89, p = .381. There were no general performance differences across blocks, 
t(60) = 0.52, p = .603. 
California Card Sorting Test 
The California Card Sorting Test contains the sub-tasks Free Sorting and 
Structured Sorting. The means and standard deviations for the scores used in the analysis 
are provided in table 4.5. Table 4.4 shows that overall, performance for sorting the 
stimuli and for identifying sorting rules were correlated for each of the verbal and the 
non-verbal sorts, with stronger associations in the nonverbal domain. Also, performance 
on the verbal and nonverbal domain were either uncorrelated (e.g., Structured Sorting 
descriptions), or negatively correlated (e.g., Free Sorting descriptions). In the Free 
Sorting Task, the number of attempted sorts, correct sorts in the nonverbal domain, 
perseverance, as well as erroneous sorts (nontarget and unequal sorts) was not influenced 
by emotion condition, task, and block order.  
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For the number of correct sorts in the verbal domain, an ANOVA with emotion 
condition, task order and block order as factors showed a significant interaction of 
emotion condition and block order, F(2, 45) = 4.38, p = .018. Follow-up analyses showed 
that the only significant effect emerged when the CCST task occurred within the first 
block of the experiment (see Table 4.2).  Then, emotions significantly influenced correct 
sorts in the verbal domain, F(2, 25) = 3.75, p = .038. Happy participants performed worse 
then control participants (1.44; 2.00), t(19) = 2.20, p = .040, and than relieved 
participants (1.44; 2.23), t(20) = 2.50, p = .021. Other mean differences were not 
significant. Figure 4.3 illustrates that when the CCST task occurred in the first block, 
happy participants produced generally fewer correct sorts (including verbal, nonverbal, 
and perseverance) than relieved participants (3.22; 4.69), t(20) = 2.67, p = .015, and 
control participants (3.22; 4.08), t(19) = 2.24, p = .037. When aggregating across emotion 
conditions, general performance in Correct Sorts, verbal, was marginally worse in the 
first compared to the second block (1.94; 2.25), t(60) = 1.74, p = .088. 
In contrast to the production of sorts, there was no influence of emotions on the 
number of descriptions for sorting rules in the Free Sorting sub-task or in the Structured 
Sorting sub-task. The number of correct descriptions (with and without perseverance) and 
erroneous descriptions (nontarget and nonmatch descriptions) in the Free Sorting task 
was not influenced by emotion condition, task or block order. Similarly, in the Structured 
Sorting task, a repeated measures ANOVA with emotion condition, task order and block 
order as between factors and domain (verbal/nonverbal) as a within factor on number of 
correctly recognized sorting rules showed no effects. General performance for these 
measures also did not differ across blocks. 
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Relation between flexibility tasks 
 We expected a positive association between tasks from the associative flexibility 
domain, and a negative correlation between tasks from the associative and the regulative 
flexibility domain. Regulative and attentional flexibility could be correlated since both 
are executive functions.  
Associative flexibility was measured with an idea generation and a remote 
associates test. However, there was no correlation between scores from the idea 
generation task and from the remote associates test. Given the task order effects in 
previous analyses, we analyzed the association between these tasks separately by task 
order. Fluency within the first minute was positively associated with remote associates 
test performance when the idea generation task came first, r(16) = .69, p = .003, or when 
the remote associates task came last, r(26) = .42, p = .035. There were no other 
significant relations. 
 Regulative flexibility was assessed with a reversal learning task and attentional 
flexibility with a California Card Sorting task. Reversal learning was not associated with 
any of the CCST scores in the sample total or with analyses by block order.  
 We analyzed the relation between associative and regulative flexibility tasks. Idea 
generation scores and remote associates test performance were not correlated with 
reversal learning.  
We also explored the relation between associative and attentional flexibility tasks. 
There were several relations between idea generation and performance on the CCST. 
Correct Sorts from the verbal domain in the CCST was positively correlated with Fluency 
in the first minute, r(62) = .26, p = .046. Also, Sorting Perseverance was positively 
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associated with Fluency in five minutes, r(62) = .28, p = .026, Category Flexibility, r(62) 
= .29, p = .022, and Originality, r(62) = .28, p = .030. When both tasks occurred in the 
first block, the relation between idea generation and CCST scores varied across task 
order. For example, when the idea generation task occurred first, the relations of idea 
generation scores and Correct Sorts, verbal, were positive, but when the idea generation 
task came last, the relations were negative. When both tasks occurred in the second 
block, Correct Sorts, verbal, showed overall positive correlations with idea generation 
scores. 
The remote associates test was correlated with two scores from the CCST. 
Specifically, Correct Sorts as well as Correct Descriptions from the nonverbal domain 
correlated with remote associates test, r(62) = .32, p = .012, and r(62) = .34, p = .006. 
When the remote associate and the CCST task came in the first block, Correct Sorts and 
Descriptions from both the verbal and nonverbal domain of the CCST showed positive 
relations to remote associates test performance across task order, though only one 
correlation was significant. However, when the tasks occurred in the second block, the 
(nonsignificant) relations between scores varied across task order. Overall, there were 
positive associations between fluency, remote associates test, and performance on the 
CCST, but the relations were sensitive to block and task order.  
Discussion 
 The goal of the present study was to test the influence of different positive 
emotions on different types of flexibility. Specifically, we introduced the distinction 
between associative flexibility as the ability to generate unusual associations, regulative 
flexibility as the ability to adapt to changing reward contingencies, and attentional 
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flexibility as the ability to shift attentional sets. Based on previous research showing 
different effects of positive affect on performance on a variety of flexibility tasks, we 
predicted that happiness, but not relief, would improve associative flexibility, but impair 
regulative flexibility.  
Associative flexibility was measured with an idea generation task and a remote 
associates test. In line with previous research, we found that happiness improved fluency, 
category flexibility, and originality in the idea generation task. However, the effect was 
sensitive to task order, and only occurred when the idea generation task came later in the 
study. Task order also moderated how emotions influence performance on a remote 
associates test. Here, the results were ambiguous, since happiness impaired or improved 
performance depending on task order. Thus, we were not able to replicate previous 
research on the influence of positive affect on remote associates test performance.  
 Regulative flexibility was assessed with a reversal learning task. We replicated 
previous research (Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009) and found that happiness impaired 
flexibility in reversal learning, but relief did not impair performance.  
Attentional flexibility was assessed with the CCST. For this task, no previous 
research on the influence of current emotions existed. We found that happiness impaired 
performance for initiating sorts from the verbal domain. However, this effect was 
sensitive to order effects, and only occurred when the task came in the first block of the 
study. Performance for the nonverbal domain and the ability to generate sorting rules 
were not affected by emotions. Thus, there was some indication that happiness impaired 
performance on the CCST similarly to the executive function in regulative flexibility, but 
the evidence was relatively weak.  
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Compared to previously published data (Greve, Williams, et al., 1995), our 
sample performed relatively poorly in the CCST. This could be due to a lack of 
motivation in our sample, to the computerized version of the test, or to other factors. The 
computerized version differs from an administration by an experimenter in several ways. 
First, the experimenter is not present to monitor and encourage sorts. Second, with an 
experimenter, the subjects have additional time to think or take a break while the 
experimenter re-organizes the cards (compare Beatty & Monson, 1990). In the 
computerized version we developed, respondents do not receive this extra time. However, 
it would be possible to introduce a monitoring system, feedback, or extra time between 
sorts. Future research is necessary to judge the value of changing different parameters in 
a computerized version of the CCST.  
 One goal of the study was to show that the impairment of reversal learning with 
happiness is not due to confounding factors. Although our results were influenced by 
order effects, we showed that the happiness manipulation used in our paradigm did not 
impair performance generally, but was specific to reversal learning. We also showed that 
performance on other tasks such as fluency in idea generation was improved with 
happiness. 
Furthermore, our results are consistent with the prediction that happiness 
influences different types of flexibility differentially. Specifically, we showed that 
happiness improved associative flexibility in the idea generation task, impaired regulative 
flexibility in the reversal learning task, and somewhat impaired attentional flexibility in 
the CCST task. The effects of the CCST task were sensitive to order effects and, given 
that there was no pre-existing research assessing the influence of emotions on this task, 
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replication is important. It is possible that the influence of emotions is different for 
reward-based flexibility and attention-based flexibility. We found support for the 
differentiation of the influence of happiness on associative and regulative flexibility, but 
more research is necessary regarding attentional flexibility. Overall, our results suggest 
that the influence of emotions on flexibility is no weaker or stronger for associative than 
for regulative flexibility.  
Unlike happiness, relief did not improve associative flexibility and reduce 
regulative flexibility. We had suggested that differences in underlying appraisals may 
explain the differential effect of happiness and relief. Specifically, happiness can be 
characterized as higher in perceptions of control and beliefs in a good and just world 
compared to relief or a neutral state (Tong, 2008). Perceptions that the world is good and 
fair do not require an individual to understand the logic of changes in reward-
contingencies, and may not induce attempts to increase predictability. The same belief 
may also improve associative flexibility because the safety signal from this belief could 
increase exploratory and creative behavior (Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). 
Thus, the belief in a good and fair world may decrease regulative flexibility and increase 
associative flexibility.  
With our design, we were able to examine performance on different associative 
tasks and a regulative flexibility task at the individual level. We found weak associations 
between associative flexibility tasks (idea generation and remote associates test). The 
relations between the two tasks measuring associative flexibility and other types of 
flexibility were mixed. Specifically, we did not find that group differences between 
happy, relieved, and control participants’ performance on regulative and associative 
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flexibility were reflected in individual differences. Associative and regulative flexibility 
may not be correlated on an individual level if, for example, a third variable influences 
performance. For example, smart individuals may perform well on reversal learning and 
fluency tasks. When grouping individuals by intelligence, fluency and reversal learning 
may be positively associated across groups. However, for the grouping variable emotion, 
fluency and reversal learning may be negatively associated across groups. With smart 
individuals in either emotion group, individual differences would not correspond to either 
group difference. Future research is required to understand which variables explain 
differences between variable relations at the group and the individual level.  
Given that we used multiple measures within one study, it is not surprising to find 
task order effects. However, it is important to examine whether these effects are merely 
noise, or if there is a systematic pattern in the results. Future research could examine how 
performance on one task facilitates or impairs performance on a subsequent task. The 
effects of task order within a block may also be the result of distraction or a general lag 
effect, and block order effects may be a result of fatigue. We found different types of 
order effects for the influence of emotions on associative and attentional flexibility tasks.  
For both associative flexibility tasks, we found primarily task order effects: Our 
prediction that happiness would facilitate performance was confirmed only when the task 
came last within a block of tasks. Based on the findings, we speculate that the influence 
of emotions on creativity tasks might require a time lag to show. There is some indication 
from past research that this might indeed be the case. In several studies, filler tasks are 
administered before an associative flexibility task (e.g., Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton, 
& Martin, 1997; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993; Sanna, Turley, & Mark, 1996). 
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However, in other studies, no filler tasks were used or reported and happiness did have an 
effect on idea generation (e.g., Bohner & Schwarz, 1993; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, & 
Robinson, 1985). 
According to the Mood as Input Model, mood manipulations might not have an 
effect on immediately following tasks because participants might discount the 
information provided by their mood if they are aware of the mood induction (Martin et 
al., 1993). However, it is not clear why this would only affect associative flexibility and 
not regulative flexibility. Alternatively, thoughts generated by remembering a happy 
event may lead to a preoccupation with the happy event, and diminish the advantage of 
positive affect on associative flexibility until the distracting thoughts vanish after some 
time. This idea is in line with capacity theories that predict that emotions increase 
cognitive load (Mackie & Worth, 1989). Manipulations that facilitate or inhibit the 
termination of thoughts related to the happiness experience would be useful to test this 
idea. Alternatively, happiness might increase the accessibility of cognitive material so 
much that associations become chaotic and response generation is impaired. According to 
this view, happiness is akin to manic or schizophrenic states in which thoughts cannot be 
organized well. Not until emotion decreases after some time can optimal levels of free 
associations be reached and generate ideas. This explanation could be tested by designing 
a task where ideas can be generated in a more or less structured way (e.g., mere free 
association versus brain-storming solutions to complex problems). Finally, beliefs in a 
good and fair world associated with happiness (Tong, 2008) might initially result in 
maintenance of the pleasant status quo (compare Schwarz & Clore, 2007) and only later 
lead to creative and explorative behavior (compare Fredrickson, 1998). These 
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explanations are quite speculative. Further research is required to establish the sensitivity 
of associative flexibility to order effects by replicating our results, and to understand its 
underlying cause. 
Block order did not affect associative flexibility tasks, suggesting that these tasks 
are not sensitive to fatigue or preceding events. However, for the CCST, emotions only 
made a difference when the task came in the first block. If block order effects are an 
indicator of fatigue, then performance on executive function tasks should generally be 
lower when they occur in the second block. However, performance on the CCST and the 
reversal learning task was not generally lower in the second block of the task, even 
though in the second block, emotions did not result in performance differences on the 
CCST. This indicates that fatigue did not play a major role in these executive function 
tasks, and the block effect for the CCST cannot be explained that way. 
Besides order effects, a major limitation of the study was that self-reported 
feelings did not differentiate well between different emotion conditions. Participants in 
the happy condition differed from control and relieved participants significantly only at 
time 2. Although happiness can generally be characterized as feeling certain and in 
control more than relief (Tong, 2008), self-reported feelings of certainty/confusion did 
not differ across emotion conditions. Given the significant effects on performance, it is 
possible that the manipulation checks were insensitive to the differences between 
emotions. Also, relieved and control participants did not differ on self-reported feelings, 
and also did not differ on most of the dependent variables. Thus, it is possible that 
participants in the relief condition did not feel particularly emotional at all. Interestingly, 
for idea generation and reversal learning, the difference between the happy and the 
   
 116 
relieved condition was stronger than between the happy and the control condition (like 
Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009). Future research replicating the finding that difference in 
cognitive performance with happiness and relief may occur without changes in subjective 
feeling is necessary to show that rather than emotions, conceptualizations of emotional 
experiences evoked by remembering happy and relief stories are responsible for the 
influence of emotional story on cognitive flexibility. 
A further limitation was that several subjects were excluded from the analysis 
because they were suspicious or because they were run during break and showed a 
different pattern of results than the remainder of the sample. The first problem could be 
ameliorated in future research by using a better cover story. However, understanding and 
dealing with the ‘break effect’ seems more complicated. A systematic analysis of changes 
in participants’ motivation, cognitive abilities, and general mood during break could shed 
some light on this issue. Regardless of the underlying reasons, the fact that emotions do 
not influence regulative flexibility during break time indicates that the effects are not 
robust. Future research is required to better understand which variables change the 
relation of emotion and cognitive flexibility, and why. 
Study 1 showed that manipulating happiness and relief – as emotion or an 
emotional conceptualization - had different outcomes for cognitive flexibility. 
Specifically, happiness, but not relief, facilitated associative flexibility in idea generation, 
and impaired regulative flexibility in reversal learning.  
An important question is how these differences can be explained. To develop a 
parsimonious theory for the influence of emotions on cognitive tendencies, identifying 
mediators in the relation between emotion and flexibility could be useful. Different 
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variables could be mediators. For example, happiness and relief differ with regard to 
several underlying appraisals. Specifically, beliefs in a good and just world under 
happiness might facilitate subsequent creativity (Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 
2007), and reduce the need to monitor reward contingencies. Also, increases in dopamine 
levels may differ with happiness and relief. Increased dopamine facilitates associative 
flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999) but reduces regulative flexibility (Cools et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, associative flexibility has often been attributed to, or closely related with, 
global processing (e.g., Fredrickson, 1998; Isen et al., 1985; Schwarz & Clore, 2007) and 
with unfocused or distracted processing (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006). 
However, as an executive function regulative flexibility may require attention to detail 
and focused thinking. If associative flexibility is mediated by global and unfocused 
thinking, and regulative flexibility requires local and focused thinking, the influence of 
emotions could be described as a function of increases and decreases of global and 
focused thinking. This possibility will be examined in study 2.   
Study 2 
Study 1 showed that happiness has different effects on different types of 
flexibility. An explanation of these results may be informed by the identification of 
mediators. The goal of study 2 is to identify whether the influence of happiness and relief 
on regulative flexibility is mediated by goal maintenance and global processing. Both 
processes are central in theorizing about associative flexibility, and may inform a theory 
explaining the influence of emotions on flexibility more generally. However, to our 
knowledge, there is no research on the relation of regulative flexibility, goal maintenance, 
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and global processing. Therefore, another goal of study 2 is to contribute to the 
knowledge on the relation between these cognitive processes. 
Goal maintenance refers to the ability to persevere in goal pursuit when faced 
with distracters. Synonyms are “focused thinking” and “perseverance,” and an antonym 
is “distractibility.” Mediated by dopamine, cognitive flexibility may be antagonistic to 
stable maintenance (e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Individuals may be able to adjust 
the balance between flexibility and maintenance depending on the context (Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004). While distractibility may be beneficial for associative flexibility, 
distraction may be detrimental to performing well on executive tasks, such as regulative 
flexibility tasks.  
Goal maintenance can be assessed with a continuous performance paradigm, 
where information that precedes a stimulus in time (so-called context information) is 
necessary to react appropriately to the stimulus (Dreisbach, 2006).  Whether more or less 
goal maintenance will result in good performance depends on the task. For example, for 
some tasks the ability to detach from previously relevant information is required to 
perform well (e.g., Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). Goal maintenance does not therefore 
reflect an individual’s motivation or ability to “perform well” on a task, but rather reflects 
the tendency to maintain prior goals. 
In addition to goal maintenance, global processing has also been suggested as 
important for understanding the influence of emotions on associative flexibility. Global 
processing refers to a tendency to process information based on an overall schema or 
Gestalt, rather than on individual elements of knowledge. More specifically, global 
processing refers to a perception of a pattern based on its global configuration, while 
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local processing refers to attention to the local elements that make up the Gestalt. For 
example, a large letter L can be constructed from small Ts. When asked which letter is 
shown, identifying the letter “L” demonstrates a global focus, and identifying the letter 
“T” a local focus. Similarly, a square-shaped Gestalt can be constructed from triangular 
elements (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982).  
Global processing can be interpreted as an indicator of broad thinking, and broad 
thinking is perceived to facilitate flexibility (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Isen et 
al., 1992). For example, Isen and colleagues suggest that “positive affect cues a broad set 
or range of material . . . and the happy person . . . may see a different set of relations 
among items” (Isen et al., 1985, p. 1414) resulting in better performance in idea 
generation (Isen et al., 1985) and broader categorization (Isen, Niedenthal, & Cantor, 
1992). Similarly, the Broaden and Build Theory suggests that “positive emotions broaden 
a person’s momentary thought-action repertoire. Accordingly, experiences of certain 
positive emotions prompt individuals . . . to pursue novel, creative, and often unscripted 
paths of thought and action” (Fredrickson, 1998, p. 304). Global processing can also be 
interpreted as an indicator of schema driven, or top-down processing (e.g., Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). Top-down processing has been seen as advantageous for solving 
associative flexibility in remote associate problems and other creativity tasks (Schwarz & 
Clore, 2007). However, a bottom-up or data driven processing style indicated by local 
processing may be beneficial for performance in an executive function, such as regulative 
flexibility. Overall, broad perceptual attention indicated by global processing and 
associative flexibility are perceived as closely related (Friedman & Förster, 2005). 
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Based on the importance of goal maintenance and global processing for 
associative flexibility, the goal of study 2 is to identify whether goal maintenance and 
global processing mediate the relation of emotions and regulative flexibility. Previous 
research provides information on how happiness influences these cognitive tendencies. 
One goal of study 2 is to replicate this research. To our knowledge, no research has 
examined the influence of relief on attention and global processing, which will be 
explored in this study.  
A necessary condition for a mediation model is that the variables be related to 
each other in a consistent way. For example, if goal maintenance mediates the influence 
of happiness on regulative flexibility, then goal maintenance and regulative flexibility 
must be positively related. Thus, a second goal of study 2 is to examine the relation 
between reversal learning, global processing, and goal maintenance. To our knowledge, 
no paper has focused directly on the relation of these three cognitive tendencies. 
Although information on group differences exists, group differences do not necessarily 
provide information about the relation among variables at the individual level. While 
happiness might result in poor reversal learning and reduced goal maintenance, reversal 
learning and goal maintenance might not necessarily be positively correlated. However, 
this correlation is necessary for mediation. Existing literature on group differences 
regarding reversal learning, global processing, and goal maintenance will be used to 
derive predictions for a mediation model.  
Emotions and Reversal Learning, Global/Local Processing, and Goal Maintenance 
Knowledge about how emotions influence reversal learning, global processing, 
and goal maintenance is generally limited, but exists for happiness. Study 1 showed that 
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happiness impairs reversal learning. Other research shows that happiness is associated 
with global and distracted thinking. For example, happy individuals use global rather than 
local criteria for decision making (Gasper & Clore, 2002). Also, positive affect reduces 
goal maintenance on a continuous performance task (Dreisbach, 2006) and decreases 
perseverance on a variant of the task switching task (Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). 
Positive affect also increases distractibility due to novel stimuli in a task switching task 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). A lack of goal maintenance is also indicated by increased 
variety seeking (Kahn & Isen, 1993) with positive affect.  
Group differences in reversal learning and in goal maintenance have also been 
found in research on patient groups and medicated healthy individuals. Parkinson’s 
disease is associated with reduced levels of dopamine, and medication of Parkinson’s 
patients generally increases dopamine levels. Parkinson’s patients on medication (with 
higher levels of dopamine) show impaired performance on a reversal learning task (Cools 
et al., 2001). In line with this, administration of a dopamine agonist (which resembles 
dopamine in its effect as opposed to an antagonist which blocks the dopamine effect) 
impairs reversal learning performance in healthy participants (Mehta, Swainson, Ogilvie, 
Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001). Also, the ability to ignore distracters is decreased in 
medicated Parkinson’s patients with higher dopamine (Moustafa, Sherman, & Frank, 
2008). Thus, higher levels of dopamine are associated with worse reversal learning and 
goal maintenance, suggesting a positive relation between these abilities. 
Similarly, schizophrenic patients show impaired performance on reversal learning 
(Waltz & Gold, 2007). Goal and context maintenance are also impaired in schizophrenic 
patients (Servan-Schreiber, Cohen, & Steingard, 1996). Thus, the performance profile of 
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schizophrenic patients suggests that poor performance on reversal learning could be 
associated with reduced goal maintenance. 
The Relation of Reversal Learning, Global Processing, and Goal Maintenance 
To our knowledge, no paper has described the relation of performance on reversal 
learning, global processing, and goal maintenance directly. To examine if global 
processing and goal maintenance mediate the differences between groups of happy, 
relieved, and control participants, individual differences should mirror group differences. 
Although group-level differences are not necessarily reflected in individual differences, 
predictions about the relation between these variables can be based on the hypothesis that 
cognitive tendencies co-occur in a systematic way to facilitate optimal processing, and 
that relations between variables can be explained in a parsimonious way. If specific 
conditions such as emotional or pathological states cause specific cognitive tendencies, 
the tendencies might co-occur under different conditions as well and might be related to 
each other in a similar fashion to the differences between emotion groups reviewed in the 
previous section.  
Theoretically, a case can be made for a positive association between regulative 
flexibility and goal maintenance, and for a negative association between regulative 
flexibility with global processing.  The following theoretical discussion covers both 
associative and regulative flexibility. I suggest that associative flexibility will increase 
when thinking is unfocused and open to novelty, allowing a spread of activations to 
unusual associations (compare Phillips et al., 2002). Distraction leads to quickly jumping 
from one topic to another, from one category to another. Because of lack of focus, 
associative flexibility is effortless. Associative flexibility will also increase when 
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thinking is broad, connective, inclusive, and global, rather than detail-oriented, 
discriminative, exclusive, and local, because it is based on accepting and including 
different elements in the universe of possible solutions to a problem. 
Regulative flexibility will increase when thinking is focused rather than 
unfocused because it requires the maintenance of a goal (compare Phillips, Bull, Adams, 
& Fraser, 2002). Having a goal reduces distractibility (Müller  et al., 2007). Because of 
goal-maintenance, regulative flexibility is an executive function. Regulative flexibility 
will also increase when thinking is analytic, detail-oriented, and local, because it requires 
the ability to identify changes in the environment and discriminate different rules. 
Because of bottom-up processing, regulative flexibility can be distinguished from other 
executive functions (e.g., working memory, continuous inhibition as in the Stroop task, 
planning). 
In contrast to goal maintenance and reversal learning, where the relation between 
variables is expected to resemble group differences, we expect top-down and focused 
thinking to be independent (Table 4.6). Thus, various combinations of these processes 
could be identified with different emotional states, and lead to different predictions for 
the effect of an emotion on cognitive flexibility.  
Hypotheses 
 We expect that happiness will increase global processing, and reduce goal 
maintenance and reversal learning. The influence of relief on global processing and goal 
maintenance will be explored. Also, we expect that good reversal learning performance 
will be positively correlated with goal maintenance and negatively with global 
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processing. Finally, we expect that global processing and lack of goal maintenance 
mediate the influence of happiness on reversal learning (see Figure 4.4). 
Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and thirty-three students (69 women; mean age = 18) participated in 
the study for partial course credit. The majority of the participants were Caucasian (74 
%), some were African-American (10%) and Asian-American (10%) or of other 
ethnicities (6%). 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to the procedure in study 1. Participants were told that 
we were conducting two studies: One on the effect of length of essay writing on feelings, 
and a second on the relation between various cognitive tasks. After signing a fake consent 
form for each study, participants were randomly assigned to a happy, relieved, or control 
condition. After participants provided two events where they felt happy or relieved, or 
selected two weekdays (Monday – Thursday), we asked participants to write about the 
first event (weekday) for 9 minutes. After a manipulation check where participants 
indicated their current feelings, the first block of cognitive tasks was administered. Then, 
we induced moods again by asking participants to write a longer essay for 9 minutes 
about the second event (weekday), followed by a second manipulation check, and a 
second block of cognitive tasks. In one task block, participants performed the reversal 
learning task. In the other block, a continuous performance task to measure goal 
maintenance (Dreisbach, 2006) and a global/local task to measure top-down processing 
(Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) were administered. The order of these tasks was counter-
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balanced. The order of the blocks was also counterbalanced. Participants provided 
demographic information before they were probed for suspicion, debriefed, and asked to 
sign the consent form for the entire study. The duration of the study was no longer than 
one hour. 
Measures 
Emotion arousal. We employed the method of life event essays to induce 
emotion.  The instructions for the happy condition read “Remember a recent event in 
your life that made you feel HAPPY and POSITIVE. Visualize the event in your mind, 
imagine the event vividly. Try to re-experience the original perceptions, sensations, and 
affective reactions. Write down the imagined event and elaborate on your thoughts and 
feelings.” In the relieved condition, ‘happy’ was replaced with ‘relieved.’ Control 
condition participants were asked to write about a regular week-day. 
Mood assessment. After the emotion arousal and again at the end of the study, 
participants were asked to indicate how they felt, at this moment, on five 9-point items 
anchored with “very bad - very good,” “very unhappy – very happy,” “not at all relieved 
– very relieved,” “very calm – very active,” and “very certain / not confused – very 
uncertain / confused.” 
Reversal learning task. In the reversal learning task, participants saw two stimuli 
and selected the one with a higher chance of being ‘correct.’ Unknown to participants, the 
probability of a stimulus being correct was 80%. Participants learned which stimulus was 
correct through feedback (rule learning). The stimulus that was correct changed twice 
(first and second reversal learning). Participants were told that the correct stimulus could 
change, but not how often or when. We used the E-prime script of Waltz and Gold 
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(2007). Stimuli were grey-scale fractals. Participants had to select the correct stimulus in 
9 trials out of 10 (programmed in blocks of 5) before the pattern changed. If the 
participant did not reach this criterion, the pattern changed after the 50th trial. The 
program allowed up to 2 reversals. Participants repeated the task three times with 
different stimulus pairs.  
We computed the number of trials that participants took to learn a rule/reversal as 
a dependent measure. For those subjects who did not reach a reversal within 50 trials and 
thus had no value for the reversal, missing data was replaced by a score of 50 (the 
maximum score; the mean plus two standard deviations was used in previous research by 
Sacharin & Gonzalez, 2009, but this value exceeded the maximum score in the current 
sample). Number of trials for rule/reversal learning was averaged across the three 
repetitions, so that each subject had one score for each rule, first reversal, and second 
reversal learning ranging from 10 (good performance) to 50 (poor performance). To 
facilitate a joint analysis of reversal learning performance with performance on the other 
tasks used in this study, we subtracted the number of trials to learn rules from the average 
of the number of trials to learn reversals as a measure of reversal learning. Higher scores 
indicate poorer performance. 
Goal maintenance: We used an AX-Continuous performance task, in which 
participants see letter strings of black and red letters. The task is to focus on the black 
letters and to press the right key, whenever the cue ‘X’ is followed by the probe ‘A,’ and 
to press the left key when a cue other than ‘X’ is followed by any letter, or a different cue 
precedes the probe ‘A.’ In this task, errors on A-notX tasks indicate too much goal 
maintenance, and errors on notA-X trials indicate too little goal maintenance (compare 
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Dreisbach, 2006). A difference score of A-notX and notA-X trial error rates was used as 
a measure of goal maintenance (compare Moustafa et al., 2008). Higher scores indicate 
more goal maintenance. 
Global/local task: In the Kimchi & Palmer (1982) task, participants see a top 
figure and two bottom figures. They have to determine which of the bottom figures is 
more similar to the top figure, either based on local or global features of the stimulus. The 
sum score of the stimuli that are selected based on global features is the index for global 
processing, with a maximum value of 24. Higher scores indicate more global processing. 
Results 
Manipulation Check 
Feelings were assessed twice during the study, following each emotion induction. 
At time 1, self-reported feelings on five items differed, F(4, 464) = 113.00, p < .01. We 
found a significant interaction of emotion condition, gender, and feeling item at time 1 
F(8, 464) = 2.28, p = .021. Specifically, in the happy compared to the control condition 
women felt better (7.10; 6.27), t(40) = 2.11, p = .041, happier (7.20; 6.42), t(44) = 2.05, p 
= .047, and more active (5.20; 3.81), t(44) = 2.94, p = .005, and in the happy compared to 
the relieved condition, they felt happier (7.20; 6.17), t(41) = 2.01, p = .051, and less 
uncertain (3.00; 3.96), t(37) = 2.12, p = .040. Other mean differences were not 
significant. 
Men, however, did not show significant differences between the happy and 
control condition, but men reported more happiness in the relief than in the control 
condition (6.94; 5.81), t(37) = 2.43, p = .020. Other mean differences were not 
significant. 
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At time 2, the gender difference was not significant. Differences between feeling 
items, F(4, 464) = 50.35, p < .01, and between emotion conditions, F(2, 116) = 4.44, p = 
.014, were qualified by a significant interaction of feeling items by condition, F(8, 464) = 
2.23, p = .024. Across genders, participants in the happy condition felt better (6.83; 5.70), 
t(83) = 3.27, p = .002, happier (6.78; 5.66), t(90) = 3.22, p = .002, and more active (5.00; 
4.11), t(90) = 2.20, p = .030, than the control, and happier (6.78; 5.85), t(84) = 2.62, p = 
.011, than the relief condition. Other mean differences were not significant. 
To show comparisons with the time 1 data, we also looked at feelings reported 
separately by gender at time 2. Women in the happy condition felt better (7.05; 5.64), 
t(40) = 2.87,  p = .007, and happier (6.85; 5.69), t(44) = 2.25, p = .030, than in the control 
condition and happier (6.85; 5.61), t(41) =  2.08, p = .044, than in the relief condition. 
Other mean differences were not significant. For men, at time 2, participants in the happy 
condition reported more happiness (6.72; 5.62), t(44) = 2.27,  p = .028, than the control, 
and the happy and relief conditions did not differ on self-reported feelings. Other mean 
differences were not significant. Given the gender differences in emotion induction, I 
included gender as a variable in subsequent analyses. 
The Influence of Emotions on Reversal Learning 
 An ANOVA with task order, gender, and emotion condition as factors showed 
that the influence of emotions on reversal learning was qualified by an interaction with 
gender, F(2, 121) = 3.54, p = .032. Other effects were not significant. Emotions had a 
significant effect on reversal learning for women, F(2, 57) = 3.18, p = .049. Women 
showed reversal learning impairments in the happy condition compared to the relief 
(15.58; 9.23), t(41) = 2.17, p = .036, and control condition (15.58; 10.45), t(44) = 2.46, p 
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= .056. The latter two conditions did not differ from each other. For men, emotions did 
not influence reversal learning, F(2, 52) =  0.47, p = .631. There were no other effects. 
Thus, women showed the predicted impairment of reversal learning with happiness, but 
men did not. 
The Influence of Emotions on Global Processing 
No significant effects of emotions or gender on global processing emerged; all ps 
> .05. 
The Influence of Emotions on Goal Maintenance 
An ANOVA with task order, gender, and emotion condition as factors showed a 
significant interaction of emotion condition with gender emerged, F(2, 109) = 3.62, p = 
.030. For women, emotion condition predicted goal maintenance, F(2, 57) = 4.21, p = 
.020. Women in the happy condition did not differ from the control (7.25; 0.81), t(44) = 
1.24, p = .222, or the relief condition, (7.25; 13.26), t(41) = 1.06, p = .294. However, 
women in the relief condition showed more goal maintenance than the control 
participants (13.26; 0.81), t(47) = 2.12, p = .039. For men, there was no significant effect 
of emotion condition. Thus, the influence of emotion on goal maintenance was not as 
anticipated for women, and was absent for men.  
The Relation between Reversal Learning, Global Processing, and Goal Maintenance 
 We had predicted that good reversal learning performance would be positively 
related to goal maintenance, and negatively to global processing. As a higher score in the 
reversal learning task indicated poor performance, we expected that the reversal learning 
score would be negatively correlated with the goal maintenance score, and positively 
with the global score.  
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The reversal learning score (indicating poor performance) was negatively 
correlated with goal maintenance, r(133) = -.21, p = .018. This means that better reversal 
learning was positively associated with goal maintenance. Contrary to predictions, the 
reversal learning score was negatively correlated with global processing, r(133) = -.21, p 
= .015. This means that better reversal learning was positively associated with global 
processing. Global processing and goal maintenance were not correlated in the sample 
total, r(133) = .04, p = .69, or for the sub-samples of men or women.  
A regression of reversal learning on global processing, goal maintenance (both 
standardized), and the interaction of global processing and goal maintenance showed an 
overall significant model, p < .001. Global processing was negatively related to the 
reversal learning score, beta = -.174, p = .037. Also, goal maintenance was negatively 
associated with the reversal learning score, beta = -.225, p = .007. The effects were 
qualified by an interaction, beta = .239, p = .005. Thus, global processing and goal 
maintenance improved reversal learning (resulted in a small reversal learning score). The 
combination of local processing and distraction was particularly hurtful for reversal 
learning.  
Separate analysis by gender showed that for women, a regression of reversal 
learning on global processing and goal maintenance as well as the interaction (all 
independent variables standardized) was overall significant, p = .008. Global processing 
showed no main effect, beta = -.114, p = .32, and goal maintenance showed a significant 
effect, beta = -.226, p = .051, qualified by an interaction, beta = .325, p = .006. Low goal 
maintenance hindered reversal learning particularly in combination with local processing 
(see Figure 4.5).  
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For men, the regression model was significant, p = .051, but none of the 
predictors reached ordinary levels of significance. Global processing was negatively 
associated with the reversal learning score, beta = -.231, p = .076 (see Figure 4.6).  
The Mediation Model 
Since there was no effect of emotion condition on reversal learning for men, the 
mediation model was examined for women only. For women, including goal maintenance 
and global processing as covariates in an ANCOVA with emotion condition and task 
order as factors on reversal learning did not reduce the effect of emotion on reversal 
learning, F(2, 61) = 3.35, p = .042. However, including the interaction of global and goal 
maintenance in the model showed a main effect of the interaction term, F(1, 60) = 4.58, p 
= .037, and reduced the significance of emotion condition to p = .102.  
If the interaction of goal maintenance and global processing mediated the 
influence of emotions on reversal learning, emotions would influence the interaction 
term, which was not examined in the previous analysis of goal maintenance and global 
processing. An ANOVA with emotion condition and task order as factors showed a 
significant main effect of emotion on the goal maintenance-global interaction, F(2, 57) = 
3.60, p = .034, with no other effects. Participants in the happy condition showed a higher 
interaction score than the control participants (.23; -.34), t(44) = 2.46, p = .018. The score 
of participants in the relief condition was in between (-.04) and did not significantly 
differ from the happy and control condition.  
To understand the meaning of the interaction score, we computed grouping codes 
based on the four combinations of negative and positive z-scores to distinguish between 
participants with combinations of low/high goal maintenance and low/high global 
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processing. In the previous analysis, a combination of low goal maintenance and low 
global processing was particularly hurtful for reversal learning, and happiness was hurtful 
for reversal learning. If low goal maintenance and low global processing mediate the 
influence of happiness on reversal learning, then there should be more low/low 
participants in the happy condition, and excluding the low/low group should reduce 
differences between the emotion groups.  
 Although the happy and control condition differed in the distribution of groups 
(low/low; low/high; etc.), Chi-Square (3, 46) = 9.38, p =.025, the difference was not in 
the low/low group but in the other groups (see Table 4.7). After excluding the low/low 
group from the analysis, an ANOVA with emotion condition as a factor on reversal 
learning, the influence of emotions remained significant, with or without controlling for 
goal maintenance, global processing, and the interaction. Contrary to the expectation 
based on a mediation model, the p value improved when taking out the low/low group. 
An ANOVA with emotion condition and task order on reversal learning showed a 
significant effect of emotion, F(2, 40) = 5.70, p = .007, and when additionally controlling 
for goal maintenance, global processing, and the interaction, the effect of emotion was 
F(2, 37) = 3.93, p = .028. Thus, the influence of happiness on reversal learning was not 
explained by the relation of low goal maintenance and low global processing with 
reversal learning. Instead, emotions influence reversal learning independent of the 
influence of a particular combination of goal maintenance and global processing (Figure 
4.7). 
Post-hoc Analysis of Essays 
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 We found unexpected gender differences in the manipulation checks and task 
performance on this study. To examine the gender difference, we analyzed the essays 
written by participants in the emotion induction. Specifically, the question was whether 
men failed to follow the instruction to write about an event causing happiness or relief 
when instructed to do so, and instead wrote about happy events in the relief condition and 
vice versa. To assess if men wrote shorter and potentially less powerful essays, we 
computed the word count of each essay. Also, two coders blind to actual condition 
assignment rated the essays at time 1 and time 2 for suspected condition assignment to 
examine if the condition assignment was reflected in the essay. Rater agreement for 
condition assignment was good, Cohen’s kappa = .81, p < .01. In a different coding 
approach, we blanked out ‘happy’ and ‘relief’ words from the essays, and one coder rated 
condition assignment.  
 Word count. Participants were instructed to write more for the second essay than 
the first essay. The word count ranged between 10 and 1863 words, with a median of 250 
for the first essay, and 300 for the second essay. A mixed analysis with essay at time 1 
and at time 2 as repeated measures factor and emotion condition and gender as between 
subjects factors showed a main effect of time, F(1, 111) = 8.13, p = .005. Essays at time 2 
were longer than at time 1 (315; 267), t(150) = 3.96, p < .01. There was no gender 
difference, suggesting that men did not write shorter essays. 
 Identification of essay condition. To examine condition assignment at the level of 
essays, ratings were first combined across raters so that only essays that were 
unambiguously identified as happy or relief essays by both raters were used in analysis of 
gender differences. At time 1, raters could not identify three essays (one from the happy 
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condition, two from the relieved condition), and thought that three essays from the 
relieved condition were ‘happy.’ At time 2, raters could not identify one essay from the 
relieved condition, and thought that four essays from the relieved condition were ‘happy,’ 
and that one essay in the happy condition was ‘relieved.’ To examine effects at the level 
of subjects, only participants whose essays at time 1 and time 2 reflected condition 
assignment were included (42 for happy, 33 for relieved, 47 for control). For these 
participants, one participant in the relieved condition was classified as happy, and 42 
happy and 32 relieved participants were correctly identified. Thus, there were overall 
only a few miss-classifications of emotion condition, and the gender differences in 
emotion induction could not be attributed to ‘wrong’ essays. 
 To examine if ‘wrong’ condition assignment explained the gender difference, we 
selected only those participants whose condition assignments could be correctly 
identified. However, an ANOVA with task order, emotion condition, and gender on 
reversal learning still showed the interaction of emotion with gender, F(2, 109) = 3.52, p 
= .033. For women, emotions influenced reversal learning, F(2, 57) = 3.22, p = .048. 
Women in the happy condition performed worse than in the relief condition (15.17; 8.38), 
t(35) = 2.14, p = .039, and marginally worse than in the control condition, (15.17; 10.45), 
t(43) = 1.78, p = .082. For men, emotions did not influence reversal learning. 
 When coding ‘blanked’ essays, the results were similar. Agreement in assigned 
condition for essays at time 1 and time 2 was only absent for two essays from the happy 
condition and eight essays from the relieved condition. When only analyzing the essays 
for which time 1 and time 2 ratings were consistent, three essays from the relieved 
condition were wrongly classified as happy, while 40 happy and 30 relieved essays were 
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correctly identified. When analyzing only those participants for whom classified and 
actual condition assignment matched, happiness reduced reversal learning compared to 
relief for women (15.18; 8.38), t(35) = 2.14, p = .039, but not for men, consistent with 
previous analyses. Overall, the results of the post-hoc analysis indicate that the gender 
differences in reversal learning could not be attributed to a failure to follow the 
instructions by writing short essays or essays that were not about a happy or relieved 
event. 
Discussion 
The goal of study 2 was to examine the role of global processing and goal 
maintenance as potential mediators in the relation of emotions with reversal learning. 
Based on past research showing an association of happiness with poor reversal learning, 
global processing, and distractibility, we expected that reversal learning would be 
negatively associated with global processing and positively associated with goal 
maintenance. Also, we expected to replicate the findings from study 1. 
As in study 1, we found that happiness reduced reversal learning, but relief did 
not. However, an unexpected gender difference emerged, and men’s reversal learning 
was not influenced by emotions. The gender difference could be due to differential 
emotion arousal, because at time 1 men reported feeling the most happy in the relieved 
condition and not in the happy condition. This indicates that men and women might have 
responded differently to the emotion induction.  
Unlike in study 1, women in the happy condition reported feeling more 
certain/less confused than in the relieved condition, suggesting that feelings of certainty 
and control might matter for the difference between happiness and relief. If this were the 
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case, control participants should also report reduced certainty. However, happy 
participants did not show more certainty than control participants. Instead, other 
appraisals may be more relevant to the difference between happiness, relief, and control 
condition. For example, the belief in a good and fair world should be more prominent 
with happiness than relief or a control (compare Tong, 2008). Believing in a good and 
fair world may be related to performance in reversal learning. For example, perceptions 
that the world is good and fair might reduce an individual’s motivation to understand the 
logic of changes in reward-contingencies in an attempt to gain predictability. Future 
research should examine the importance of beliefs in a good world for performance in 
reversal learning. 
To examine if gender differences in emotion induction were due to a failure to 
follow the instruction, we conducted a post-hoc analysis of the essays written to arouse 
emotions. However, only few stories could not correctly be classified as happy or 
relieved stories indicating that - at the level of condition identification - no fundamental 
difference in the essays written by men and women existed. Future research is required to 
better understand why men did not respond to the mood manipulation in the same way as 
women. 
Based on the effects of happiness from past research on reversal learning, global 
processing, and goal maintenance, we had predicted that reversal learning would be 
improved under goal maintenance and local processing. Indeed, our results show that 
reversal learning is improved with goal maintenance. Unexpectedly, global processing is 
positively associated with reversal learning. Future research is needed to examine 
whether global processing was advantageous in the particular reversal learning paradigm 
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we employed, where fractal patterns have to be distinguished from each other. It is 
possible that a global focus facilitated the perception of differences in fractal patterns, but 
would not facilitate reversal learning were different stimuli to be used. With the current 
paradigm, we found that the combination of distraction and local processing is 
particularly hurtful for reversal learning. 
A mediation analysis showed that this specific processing combination of 
distraction and local processing does not explain the influence of emotions on reversal 
learning. It seems that happiness impairs reversal learning independent of a low level of 
goal maintenance and top-down processing. 
A limitation of the study was that we were not able to replicate specific group 
differences between the happy and the control condition for goal maintenance and global 
processing. Although emotions influenced goal maintenance, we did not find that 
happiness reduced goal maintenance compared to the control. However, relief resulted in 
increased goal maintenance for women.  
Despite this limitation, we were able to examine the relation between reversal 
learning, goal maintenance, and global processing. Although in past research, happiness 
has resulted in global processing, distractibility, and poor reversal learning, we found that 
the group differences between happiness and a control were not reflected in the 
association of these cognitive tendencies. This indicates that the influence of happiness 
on reversal learning cannot be explained by a lack of goal maintenance. This study 
showed the importance of examining the relation between variables at the individual level 
in addition to the group level.  
General Discussion 
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 In this paper, we introduced the distinction between three types of flexibility. 
Associative flexibility is the ability to generate unusual associations, regulative flexibility 
the ability to adapt to changes in reward contingencies, and attentional flexibility the 
ability to shift attentional sets. Contrary to the popular belief that positive affect generally 
improves cognitive flexibility (e.g., Ashby et al., 1999), we found that happiness and 
relief had different outcomes for different types of flexibility. Specifically, we found that 
happiness, but not relief, facilitated associative flexibility in idea generation, and 
impaired regulative flexibility in reversal learning. The evidence that happiness impaired 
attentional flexibility was somewhat weak and further research is required before 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 To establish the base for a parsimonious explanation for the influence of emotions 
on flexibility, we sought to identify mediator variables. In study 2, we examined the role 
of global processing and goal maintenance as potential mediators in the relation of 
emotions with regulative flexibility. However, a mediation analysis showed that 
happiness impaired reversal learning independently of global processing and goal 
maintenance.  
Future research is required to understand why happiness and relief differ in their 
effects, but relief and control do not. For example, happiness and relief differ on a variety 
of appraisals (Tong, 2008). Beliefs in a good and fair world might explain why happiness 
impairs regulative flexibility, because this belief does not motivate an individual to learn 
and understand reward-contingencies. Belief in a good and fair world is higher with 
happiness than relief (Tong, 2008), and presumably also a control. A belief in a good and 
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just world might also improve associative flexibility. For example, the safety signal from 
this belief could increase exploratory and creative behavior (Fredrickson, 1998).  
The current research in combination with previous research on Parkinson’s 
patients suggests that dopamine might play a central role as a neural correlate of the 
emotion-cognition link. Of particular relevance are the D1 and D2 receptors that control 
tonic (long-term) and phasic (short-term) changes in dopamine and balance the functions 
of maintenance and up-dating of information (Cohen, Braver, & Brown, 2002). Higher 
tonic dopamine levels reduce the effects of phasic changes, because of a reduced contrast 
(Cohen et al., 2002). Too much dopamine can then result in a reduced contrast and 
perseverance, and too little dopamine in an increased contrast and impulsivity (Cohen et 
al., 2002). However, the specific brain regions involved also matter. For example, 
attentional flexibility is associated with the dorsal striatum and the dorso-lateral 
prefrontal cortex, and regulative flexibility with the ventral striatum and orbiofrontal 
cortex (Cools et al., 2001). Thus, a more direct test of the Dopaminergic Model’s 
prediction should assess dopamine levels. Also, a careful analysis of the brain areas 
involved in performance in different flexibility task would be useful for understanding 
differential outcomes of dopamine on flexibility. 
However, the results from study 1 suggest that different processes may mediate 
the relation of emotions with regulative and with associative flexibility. Specifically, 
although happiness impaired regulative flexibility and facilitated associative flexibility, 
regulative and associative flexibility were not correlated. This finding indicates that the 
identification of a mediator variable that could explain the effects on both associative and 
regulative flexibility might be complicated by other variables, such as intelligence. More 
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research is required before conclusions regarding the reliability of the independence of 
associative and regulative flexibility can be drawn with certainty. 
In summary, this paper shows that it is important to examine the relation between 
variables at different levels of analysis separately, because results at one level of analysis 
do not necessarily translate to another level of analysis. In study 1, the relation between 
associative and regulative flexibility at the individual level did not correspond to 
differences at the group level. In study 2, the relation between regulative flexibility, 
global processing, and goal maintenance did not reflect differences between different 
emotion groups on these cognitive tendencies. 
Understanding the underlying mechanisms of the emotion-cognition links requires 
further integration of research on emotions, cognitive tendencies, and underlying neural 
mechanisms. Also, the value of the distinction of associative, regulative, and attentional 
flexibility cannot be fully established without further research. We hope that the 
suggested taxonomy of tasks will be useful for understanding the interplay of emotion 
and cognition.  
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Footnote. 
1We also excluded fourteen participants who performed the task during midterm and 
finals week. Break was defined as the week before spring break, Thanksgiving, and 
finals. Participants during break performed significantly worse in the reversal learning 
task than not during break (14.64; 8.24), t(74) = 2.51, p = .014. The ‘break’ effect cannot 
be examined well with only 14 participants. Therefore, we created a sample from all 
participants in studies 1 and 2, as well as from Sacharin and Gonzalez (2009) resulting in 
a sample of 258 participants with a happiness, relief, or control manipulation. 8 out of 49 
participants were run during break time in the Sacharin & Gonzalez (2009), 14 out of 76 
in the study 1 sample, and 29 out of 133 in the study 2 sample. Repeated measures with 
rule and reversal learning as within factor and emotion condition and time (break/no 
break) as between factors showed a main effect of rule/reversal learning, F(2, 504) = 
160.56, p < .01, a three-way interaction of rule/reversal learning, emotion condition, and 
time, F(4, 504) = 2.46, p = .044, and no other effects. Follow-up analysis by time showed 
that emotions influenced rule/reversal learning only when the study was not run during 
break time, F(4, 408) = 3.96, p = .004. During break time, the interaction of time and 
emotion condition was not significant, F(4, 96) = 0.64, p = .639, although the groups 
were sufficiently large (happiness 18, relief 13, control 20) to detect effects. When not 
run during break, participants in the happy condition performed worse than control 
participants (reversal learning scores 11.98; 8.73), t(136) = 2.22, p = .028, and relief 
participants (11.98; 7.40), t(137) = 3.04, p = .003. However, during break, there was an 
opposite, non-significant trend in comparisons of happy with control (9.45; 12.88), t(36) 
= 1.10, p = .28, and relief participants (9.45; 12.56), t(29) = 1.10, p = .28. Figure 4.2 
shows the mean reversal learning scores in the samples for men and women run during 
break or not during break. In study 1 reported in this paper, the influence of emotions on 
poor reversal learning was not significant without excluding ‘break’ participants. When 
excluding ‘break’ participants in study 2, the effect of emotions on reversal learning was 
significant even without controlling for task order, and the test statistics changed from 
F(2, 66) = 2.82, p = .067 to F(2, 51) = 3.90, p = .026. In the sample from Sacharin & 
Gonzalez (2009), the interaction effect of happiness, relief, and control on rule/reversal 
learning improved when taking out break participants from F(4, 92) = 2.47, p = .050 to 
F(4, 76) = 4.33, p = .003. Break and non-break participants did not differ with regard to 
self-reported feelings. 
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Table 4.1 
Tasks associated with different types of flexibility 
Associative Flexibility Regulative Flexibility Attentional Flexibility 
Remote associates task 
(e.g., Mednick & Mednick, 
1967) 
Reversal rule learning task 
(e.g., Waltz & Gold, 2007) 
Task switching task 
(e.g., Monsell, 2003) 
Insight problem solving 
task 
(e.g., Duncker, 1945) 
Regime change task 
(e.g., Massey & Wu, 2005) 
Implicit association task 
(Greenwald et al., 1998) 
Categorization task 
(e.g., Isen & Daubman, 
1984) 
 Wisconsin card-sort 
(Heaton, 1981) 
Idea generation task 
(e.g., Torrance, 1974) 
 California card-sort 
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Prediction    ? 
Direction of effect  mixed   
Block order effect? no no no yes 
Block 1    - 
Block 2    n.s. 
Task order effect? yes yes n.a. no 
Task first n.s.    
Task second n.s. n.s.   
Task last     
Notes.  = happiness improves performance,  = happiness impairs performance; n.s. = 
emotion effect is not significant; n.a. = effect is not applicable 
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Table 4.3 
Frequency of responses in the idea generation task for unusual uses of a brick 
Category Example items Frequency (n (ideas)) 
Build To build a house 17.2 % 
 To make a temple to the gods (308) 
Weight To weight something down 5.8 % 
 Iron man contest (104) 
Structure To sit on 3.2 % 
 For short people to stand on when taking pictures (58) 
Art Decoration 3.1 % 
 Paint it to make it look deceptively light and then laugh when somebody tries to pick it up (55) 
Weapon To murder 3.0 % 
 For hazing (making pledges carry around bricks) (54) 
Stopper As a doorstopper 2.7 % 
 Stop your car (by putting it behind the back wheels) (49) 
Smash To smash 1.9 % 
 Nut cracker or shell cracker (34) 
Utensil To hammer 1.8 % 
 Place holder (32) 
Throw Throw 1.4 % 
 Throw out of a window because you’re mad (25) 
Play Game 1.0 % 
 Make a game of who can throw the brick the farthest (18) 
Fix Level 0.8 % 
 To fix a missing brick in a brick sidewalk (14) 
Ground Brick Break it up and to make pebbles 0.6 % 
 Grind into sand and use sand to make glass (10) 
Study material Experiment 0.4% 
 To show erosion (8) 
Gift Donate it 0.3% 
 Birthday present for a carpenter (6) 
Heating Oven 0.2 % 
 Heat up and use as bed warmer (4) 
Identifier / Marker Marking a spot 0.2% 
 Tombstone for a pet (3) 
Hiding place Hiding place 0.1% 
 Hide an extra key under (2) 
Other To inspire a poem 1.7 % 
 Use to represent something strong (30) 
Inadequate responses Do nothing 0.6% 
 I’m out of ideas (11) 
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Table 4.5 
Means and standard deviations of scores of the CCST 
Score M SD 
Attempted Sorts 5.05 1.42 
Correct Sorts 3.58 1.05 
   - Verbal 2.08 0.71 
   - Nonverbal 1.50 0.95 
Sorting Perseverance 0.73 0.98 
Nontarget Sorts 0.03 0.25 
Unequal Sorts 0.31 0.93 
Correct Descriptions, Free Sorting 2.92 0.98 
   - Verbal 1.65 0.63 
   - Nonverbal 1.27 0.96 
Description Perseverance, FS 2.79 1.53 
Nonrule Descriptions 0.97 1.15 
Nonmatching Descriptions 0.15 0.51 
Correct Descriptions, Structured Sorting 2.95 2.16 
   - Verbal 1.71 1.61 
   - Nonverbal 1.24 1.34 
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Table 4.6 
Regulative and associative flexibility performance resulting from combinations of goal 
maintenance and global processing 
Processing style  Regulative flexibility Associative flexibility 
Unfocused Top-down low high 
 Bottom-up medium medium 
Focused Top-down medium medium 
 Bottom-up high low 
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Table 4.7 
Distribution of women in different emotion conditions according to combinations of goal 
maintenance and global processing 
 Low goal maintenance High goal maintenance 
  Local Global Local Global 
Emotion Condition Happy 6 3 3 8 
  Control 6 12 6 2 
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Figure 4.1. The relation of variables at the group and individual level of analysis.  






















































Figure 4.2. Mean reversal learning scores in different samples by gender and time of data 
collection.






















Figure 4.3. Mean number of sorts in the Free Sorting sub-task of the CCST for different 
blocks of experiment and emotion conditions.




Figure 4.4. Model for the mediation of the influence of happiness on reversal learning by 









































Figure 4.5. Regression of poor reversal learning on goal maintenance and global 
processing for women. 






























Figure 4.6. Regression of poor reversal learning on goal maintenance and global 
processing for men. 
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Figure 4.7. The resulting model of the influence of happiness and the interaction of goal 
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Summary and Conclusions 
 
A large body of research in social psychology shows that positive emotions 
increase cognitive flexibility (e.g., Isen and colleagues). However, recent studies 
illustrate that different positive and negative emotions influence flexibility on creative 
tasks differently (e.g., De Dreu, Baas, & Nijstad, 2008). Also, according to research in 
both cognitive psychology and psychiatry, flexibility is not a unitary concept. In light of 
these findings, it seems necessary to specify more clearly which emotions influence 
which types of cognitive flexibility.  
In this dissertation, I differentiated between three types of flexibility. Associative 
flexibility is the ability to generate unusual associations, regulative flexibility is the 
ability to adapt to changing reward situations, and attentional flexibility is the ability to 
shift attention. In chapter 4, the different types were introduced in detail and a taxonomy 
of tasks for their assessment was proposed. The goals of the dissertation were to (a) 
review the influence of positive and negative emotions on associative flexibility, (b) 
examine how different positive emotions influence regulative and attentional flexibility, 
and (c) identify mediator variables. The predictions for the influence of emotions on 
flexibility of several models will be evaluated after a review of the major findings. 
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Summary of Major Findings 
A common belief is that positive affect improves cognitive flexibility in the 
creativity domain. The influence of emotions on associative flexibility was examined in 
chapter 2 with a meta-analysis, and in chapter 4 with an experiment. Overall, chapters 2 
and 4 showed that positive affect increased associative flexibility. In chapter 2, I 
reviewed existing experimental studies on idea generation and categorization. Meta-
analytical comparisons of positive and neutral emotions’ influence on idea generation and 
categorization showed that positive affect increased the number of ideas generated and 
the unusualness of ideas and category members. In chapter 4, associative flexibility was 
measured with an idea generation task and a remote associate task. In line with previous 
research, I found that happiness improved idea generation. 
Happiness enhances associative flexibility, but not all positive emotions do. In 
chapter 4, relief did not improve performance in idea generation. Happiness and relief 
differ in several ways. For example, happiness is associated with a belief that the world is 
good and fair. This belief might be particularly helpful for associative flexibility, because 
feeling safe and optimistic may allow for exploratory, playful, and creative behavior 
(Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). However, relief is not characterized by the 
belief in a good world (Tong, 2008), and may not facilitate associative flexibility. When 
predicting the influence of positive affect on flexibility, it is not possible to generalize 
from happiness to other positive emotions.  
It has been suggested that while happiness improves cognitive breadth and 
creativity, negative emotions have the opposite effect (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005). Contrary to the idea that negative emotions reduce flexibility, a meta-analytic 
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comparison of positive and negative emotions showed that negative emotions could 
increase associative flexibility. However, the effects were more varied than with positive 
affect. This supports the idea that positive and negative emotions are different processes 
with outcomes that do not lie on opposite ends of the same continuum. 
The influence of emotions on associative flexibility was not robust and strongly 
influenced by situational variables. In chapter 4, task order influenced the effects of 
emotions on idea generation, as well as performance in the remote associate task. In the 
meta-analysis of chapter 2, performance goals were identified as moderators, in line with 
previous research (Baas, De Dreu, & Nijstad, 2008; Davis, 2009). Another moderator of 
the emotions-cognition relationship was task difficulty. With easy tasks, the difference 
between positive and negative emotions could be larger than with difficult tasks. Thus, 
the influence of emotions was sensitive to a variety of moderators. Furthermore, a large 
amount of heterogeneity in the meta-analysis suggested that not all relevant moderators 
could be identified.  
The influence of emotions on cognitive flexibility depends not only on the 
specific emotion, but also on the type of flexibility. I found that although happiness 
improved associative flexibility, it impaired regulative flexibility. The influence of 
emotions on regulative flexibility was examined in chapters 3 and 4. Based on the 
facilitating effect of happiness on associative flexibility, the major question was whether 
happiness would also improve regulative flexibility. In chapter 3, the influence of 
different positive and negative emotions on regulative flexibility was tested 
experimentally with a reversal learning task. I found that happiness impaired reversal 
learning, but relief, worry, and sadness did not impair reversal learning. In chapter 4, I 
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replicated the result that happiness impairs flexibility in reversal learning, but relief does 
not. In study 2 of chapter 4, an unexpected gender difference emerged, and men’s 
reversal learning was not influenced by emotions. Understanding the reason for this 
gender difference requires future research.  
The appraisals underlying happiness may explain why happiness improves 
associative flexibility and impairs regulative flexibility. For example, a belief in a good 
and fair world may reduce and individual’s motivation to learn and understand reward-
contingencies, because there is no need to understand what is rewarding and what is not 
when everything is already at its best. The same belief may also improve associative 
flexibility, because the safety signal from this belief could increase exploratory and 
creative behavior (Fredrickson, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Happiness, relief, 
sadness, and worry also differ regarding associated activation levels and 
approach/avoidance tendencies (Baas et al., 2008), but these differences could not explain 
the pattern of results. 
The influence of emotions on attentional flexibility was also assessed in chapter 4. 
Attentional flexibility was assessed with a California Card Sorting Test (Delis, Squire, 
Bihrle, & Massman, 1992). I found that happiness, but not relief, impaired performance 
for initiating sorts from the verbal domain. There were no effects for nonverbal sorts or 
descriptions. Thus, while there was some indication that attentional flexibility is impaired 
under happiness, the evidence was somewhat weak, and more research is required before 
conclusions can be drawn with certainty. 
One concern was that the results in the experimental studies are not specific to 
reversal learning, but due to confounding factors resulting in a general decrease in 
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performance after happiness. In study 2 of chapter 4, I therefore assessed associative, 
regulative, and attentional flexibility simultaneously in one study. The results confirmed 
that the influence of happiness is specific to regulative flexibility, and does not reflect a 
general impairment.  
Given the multitude of types of flexibilities identified in chapter 4 and resulting 
complexity in explanations for the influence of emotions on flexibility, one goal of this 
dissertation was to identify mediator variables. Mediation could provide information 
useful in developing a parsimonious theory for the influence of emotions on cognitive 
tendencies. Mediation requires that differences on the group level are reflected in 
individual differences. Chapter 4 described why group differences are not necessarily 
reflected in individual differences. 
In chapter 4, I proposed various mediator variables and examined the potential of 
global processing and goal maintenance as potential mediators in the relation between 
emotions and regulative flexibility. Although it has been argued that flexibility in creative 
performance might be due to global and unfocused processing (Fredrickson, 1998; Isen, 
Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), I did not find that these 
processes mediated the influence of emotions on regulative flexibility. Past research 
showed that happiness increases global processing and decreases goal maintenance and 
reversal learning. Therefore, I expected that reversal learning would be negatively 
associated with global processing and positively associated with goal maintenance. 
Contrary to expectations, global processing was positively associated with reversal 
learning, a result that could be due to the specific stimuli used to assess reversal learning. 
In line with the prediction based on group differences, reversal learning was improved 
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with goal maintenance. Although emotions influenced the combination of global 
processing and goal maintenance, a mediation analysis showed that happiness impaired 
reversal learning independent of goal maintenance and global processing. It is possible 
that despite the non-mediation for regulative flexibility, global processing and goal 
maintenance might still play a role for mediating associative flexibility, if the processes 
underlying associative and regulative flexibility differ. 
Chapter 4 suggests that no one variable explains the effects of emotions on both 
associative and regulative flexibility. Although happiness influenced regulative and 
associative flexibility in opposite ways, chapter 4 showed that there was no negative 
association of the performance in these tasks on an individual level. This finding 
indicates that the identification of a mediator variable that could explain the effects on 
both associative and regulative flexibility might be complicated by other variables. For 
example, smart individuals may have high regulative and associative flexibility. When 
grouping individuals by intelligence, associative and regulative flexibility would be 
positively associated. However, when grouping individuals by emotion, associative and 
regulative flexibility would be negatively associated. With smart individuals in either 
emotion group, individual differences would not correspond to either group difference. 
More research is required before conclusions regarding the reliability of the 
independence of associative and regulative flexibility can be drawn with certainty, 
particularly given the limitations of the current research. 
Limitations 
An implicit goal of the dissertation, which was only achieved with limitations, 
was to examine the influence of emotions on cognition. Throughout chapters 3 and 4, 
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manipulation checks indicated that feeling measures were either insensitive to 
manipulated emotions or that the manipulation of emotions was of limited success. 
Clearly, using different induction techniques to arouse emotions could have shed some 
light on this issue. A meta-analytical review suggests that using this type of emotion 
induction is generally successful (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). However, 
the authors also reported that for positive emotions the effectiveness of the induction 
showed a significant amount of heterogeneity, suggesting that the success varies. It is 
possible that instead of ‘hot’ emotions, ‘cold’ emotional mind-sets were evoked. Using 
the memory of an emotional event to induce emotions is a top-down experience of 
emotions where conceptual knowledge can result in experiencing an emotion (Barrett, 
2006). However, the conceptual knowledge associated with an emotion may also guide 
behavior regardless of the experience of a feeling state (Friedman & Förster, 2005). For 
example, appraisals of a situation associated with an emotion may be carried into a new 
situation and affect decision making (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). However, it is not clear if 
only the appraisals or additional feeling states are carried over. In a study conducted to 
examine whether semantic knowledge of emotions influences emotion congruent 
judgments similarly to emotions, activating semantic concepts of emotions with a 
sentence unscrambling task showed no effect on a subsequent measure, but inducing 
emotions with films and music did (Innes-Ker & Niedenthal, 2002). Future research is 
necessary to differentiate between emotions and emotional conceptualizations, and to 
examine the influence on cognitive tendencies. 
Another limitation is that the results in study 1 of chapter 4 were heavily 
influenced by order effects. As indicated in the discussion of that chapter, future research 
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is necessary to examine if the effects occur at random or according to a systematic and 
meaningful pattern. For example, task order effects for associative flexibility tasks may 
be due to beliefs in a good and fair world associated with happiness (Tong, 2008) that 
initially result in maintenance of the pleasant status quo (compare Schwarz & Clore, 
2007) and only later lead to creative and explorative behavior (compare Fredrickson, 
1998). The results indicate that the influence of emotions / emotional mind-sets on 
flexibility may depend on the timing of a task.  
Across the experiments reported in chapters 2-4, several subjects were excluded 
from the analysis because they were suspicious, did not seem to understand the task, or 
because they were run during break. The first two problems could be ameliorated in 
future research by using better cover stories and improved task instructions. However, 
understanding and dealing with the ‘break effect’ seems more complicated. A systematic 
analysis of changes in participants’ motivation, cognitive abilities, and general mood 
during break could shed some light on this issue. Regardless of the underlying reasons, 
the fact that emotions do not influence regulative flexibility during break time indicates 
that the effects, though replicable across three studies, are not robust. Future research is 
required to better understand which variables change the relation of emotion and 
cognitive flexibility, and why. 
A further limitation is that in the three experimental studies conducted in chapters 
3 and 4, and in most of the studies reviewed in chapter 2, participants consisted of college 
students. Past research indicates that attention and memory for emotional events changes 
over the course of the life span (e.g., Mather & Carstensen, 2003). It is not clear whether 
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the emotion-cognition link is similarly affected by aging. Thus, it is not possible to know 
whether the findings presented in this dissertation extend to other populations.  
Evaluation of Findings Regarding Existing Theory 
Models predicting that positive affect increases cognitive flexibility were 
confirmed only for the contrast between positive and neutral emotions, and only for 
associative flexibility. According to the Broaden and Build Model (Fredrickson, 1998), 
positive emotions increase flexibility, because play, exploration, and networking are 
evolutionary advantageous. The Broaden and Build Theory is based on the notion that in 
contrast to positive emotions, negative emotions narrow thinking. In line with this model, 
I found that positive affect increased associative flexibility (chapter 2). However, the 
Broaden and Build Model cannot explain why negative emotions could improve 
associative flexibility (chapter 2), and why happiness impaired regulative flexibility 
(chapters 3 and 4).  
According to the Mood as Information Model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 2007), 
positive mood increases broad thinking when the mood signals that there is no problem 
requiring analytic, bottom-up thinking. Also, the Affect as Information Model assumes 
that negative and positive moods have opposite effects. When aggregating across various 
positive and negative emotions in the meta-analysis, the model was supported for 
associative flexibility with positive emotions, but not for negative emotions (chapter 2). 
However, the affect as information logic also assumes that specific emotions have 
differential effects on thinking. Appraisals associated with an emotion may signal which 
behavior is most required (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). This idea proved to be valuable for 
suggesting explanations for why various emotions may influence cognitive flexibility 
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differently. Happiness differs from the other three emotion conditions on several 
appraisals. I suggested that differences in beliefs of a good and fair world with happiness 
compared to other emotions and neutral states might explain why happiness influenced 
associative and regulative flexibility differently. Further research is required to test this 
idea. 
The models that incorporate an affect as information logic, the Mood as Input 
Model (Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993) and the Mood Behavior Model (Gendolla, 
2000), found support regarding moderators in the emotion-flexibility link (chapter 2). 
The influence of positive and negative emotions on associative flexibility was moderated 
by task goals, in line with the Mood as Input Model (Martin et al., 1993). Building on the 
affect as information logic, the mood as input model suggests that the information 
provided by moods is used differently depending on the situation. Also, task difficulty 
was a moderator, in line with the Mood Behavior Model (Gendolla, 2000). This model 
suggests that mood is but one piece of information, and that information provided by the 
task itself can outweigh the informational value of emotions. 
Capacity theories (e.g., Mackie & Worth, 1989) predict that emotions cause a 
cognitive load that reduces performance in executive functions. However, the results 
from chapters 3 and 4 did not support this idea, since neither relief, sadness, nor worry  
impaired performance in the executive function task used to assess regulative flexibility.  
The Dopaminergic Model (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999) predicts that positive 
affect increases flexibility mediated by dopamine, and makes no predictions for negative 
emotions. This was confirmed for associative flexibility, but not for regulative flexibility. 
However, the underlying rationale of the model that increased levels of dopamine 
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mediate the emotion-cognition link is nonetheless promising. In fact, the findings of this 
dissertation are well in line with the underlying logic proposed by Ashby et al.’s (1999) 
dopaminergic model. Given the relation of dopamine levels and reversal learning found 
in Parkinson’s patients, it seems that the model needs to be specified to take instances 
into account where increased dopamine impairs flexibility.  
Future Research 
A differentiation of the Dopaminergic Model was suggested in this dissertation. 
Specifically, I proposed the differentiation between different types of flexibility that are 
differently influenced by positive affect. I showed that happiness facilitates associative 
flexibility and impairs regulative flexibility. Although there was some evidence that 
happiness impairs attentional flexibility, these results should be replicated before 
conclusions can be drawn.  
Also, more research is required to confirm the taxonomy of tasks to measure 
different types of flexibility suggested in this dissertation. In the current research, only a 
limited number of the tasks were studied. Thus, further research is necessary to test the 
merit of the suggested taxonomy.  
Another differentiation of the Dopaminergic Model concerns the need to 
distinguish between different positive emotions. The research in this dissertation shows 
that happiness and relief do not affect flexibility in the same way. Future research is 
necessary to understand why these emotions had different outcomes, and how other 
emotions would influence cognitive tendencies. Also, examining the implications of 
emotions versus emotional mindsets is a fruitful avenue for future research.  
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Future research should also examine how trait differences in emotionality interact 
with state emotions. For example, trait differences in threat sensitivity increase relief 
reactions (Carver, 2009). Future research could examine how the combination of 
situational factors and trait differences in emotionality influence cognitive tendencies. 
Differences in the sensitivity to threats and rewards (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1990) 
could increase or reduce cognitive tendencies following emotional events.  
Eventually, a psychological explanation for why different emotions differently 
influence flexibility needs to be established. Current models are either not able to explain 
research evidence (e.g., capacity theories), or require further specification (e.g., which are 
the relevant appraisals). Integrating across sub-fields of psychological research (e.g., 
social and cognitive psychology) is a fruitful avenue for building a theory that can 
explain why different emotions influence different types of flexibility differently. 
The current research was inspired by the notion that positive affect improves 
cognitive flexibility across a broad range of settings. I found that happiness improves 
flexibility in creating novel associations, but impairs flexibility in dealing with changes in 
reward situations. However, relief does not improve or impair performance. Thus, neither 
positive emotion nor flexibility is a unitary concept. The distinction between flexibility 
types is important for predicting the influence of specific emotions. In the current 
dissertation, I differentiated associative, regulative, and attentional flexibility and 
proposed a related taxonomy of tasks. More research integrating knowledge on cognitive 
tendencies, affective states, and underlying mechanisms is required to develop a 
psychological explanation for the influence of emotions on cognitive flexibility.  
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